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Universal service obligations in LDCs: The effect of uniform pricing on infrastructure access

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  • Estache, Antonio
  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques
  • Zhang, Xinzhu

Abstract

This paper develops a model to analyze the impacts of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments: pricing and network investment. Under discriminatory pricing asymmetric information leads to a higher price and smaller network in the rural area than under full information. Under uniform pricing the price is also lower but the network is even smaller. In addition, under both pricing regimes not only the firm but also taxpayers have incentives to collude with the regulator. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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  • Estache, Antonio & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Zhang, Xinzhu, 2006. "Universal service obligations in LDCs: The effect of uniform pricing on infrastructure access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1155-1179, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:90:y:2006:i:6-7:p:1155-1179
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    1. Gasmi, F. & Laffont, J. J. & Sharkey, W. W., 2000. "Competition, universal service and telecommunications policy in developing countries," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 221-248, September.
    2. H. Cremer & F. Gasmi & A. Grimaud & J. J. Laffont, 2001. "Universal Service: An economic perspective," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(1), pages 5-43, March.
    3. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    4. Omar Chisari & Antonio Estache & Catherine Waddams Price, 2003. "Access by the poor in Latin America's utility reform: subsidies and service obligations," Chapters, in: Cecilia Ugaz (ed.), Utility Privatization and Regulation, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Gbo, Ake, 2000. "Cross-subsidies and network expansion in developing countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 797-805, May.
    6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    7. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
    8. Clarke, George R.G. & Wallsten, Scott J., 2002. "Universal(ly bad) service - providing infrastructure services to rural and poor urban consumers," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2868, The World Bank.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephane Straub, 2011. "Infrastructure and Development: A Critical Appraisal of the Macro-level Literature," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(5), pages 683-708.
    2. Estache, Antonio & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2010. "What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Li, Fan & Li, Shengli, 2018. "The impact of cross-subsidies on utility service quality in developing countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 217-228.
    5. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 729-770, September.
    6. Jean-Christophe Poudou & Lionel Thomas, 2010. "On optimal regulation of price and R&D with asymmetric information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(3), pages 251-269, September.
    7. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2011. "Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Strand, Jon, 2012. "Low-level versus high-level equilibrium in public utility services," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 163-172.
    9. Berg, Sanford V. & Jiang, Liangliang & Lin, Chen, 2011. "Incentives for cost shifting and misreporting: US rural universal service subsidies, 1991–2002," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 287-295.
    10. Fan Li & Wenche Wang & Zelong Yi, 2018. "Cross-Subsidies and Government Transfers: Impacts on Electricity Service Quality in Colombia," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(5), pages 1-15, May.

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