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Can decentralization be beneficial?

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  • Rubinchik-Pessach, Anna

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 89 (2005)
Issue (Month): 7 (July)
Pages: 1231-1249

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:89:y:2005:i:7:p:1231-1249

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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References

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  1. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 23-50, February.
  2. Wellisch,Dietmar, 2000. "Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521630351, 9.
  3. Hochman, Oded & Pines, David & Thisse, Jacques-François, 1994. "On the Optimal Structure of Local Governments," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. BOADWAY, Robin & MARCHAND, Maurice & VIGNEAULT, Marianne, . "The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1326, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 153-171, February.
  6. Antonio Estache & J. Cremer & Paul Seabright, 2005. "Decentralizing Public Services: What can we learn from the Theory of the Firm?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/44017, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  7. Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 313-337.
  8. Panizza, Ugo, 1999. "On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 97-139, October.
  9. Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July.
  10. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Gilbert, Guy & Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Incentives and optimal size of local jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 19-41, January.
  12. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 2003. "Incomplete Social Contracts," Scholarly Articles 4554123, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  13. Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695, 9.
  14. Harsanyi, John C., 1992. "Game and decision theoretic models in ethics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 19, pages 669-707 Elsevier.
  15. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
  16. repec:fth:louvco:9803 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
  1. Hatfield, John, 2006. "Federalism, Taxation, and Economic Growth," Research Papers 1929, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  2. Roland Andersson & Bo Söderberg, 2012. "Financing roads and railways with decentralized real estate taxes: the case of Sweden," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 839-853, June.
  3. Marko Köthenbürger, 2007. "Revisiting the “Decentralization Theorem” – On the Role of Externalities," CESifo Working Paper Series 2128, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Kimiko Terai, 2008. "Interregional Disparities in Productivity and the Choice of Fiscal Regime," Working Papers 070813, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  5. Gersbach, Hans, 2005. "Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5013, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Christoph Luelfesmann, 2007. "Dual Provision of Public Policies in Democracy," Discussion Papers dp07-20, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
  7. Paulo Arvate & Vladimir Ponczek, 2008. "Municipality secession, voter’s preference and persistence of power," Working Papers 08_07, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
  8. Paulo Júlio & Susana Peralta, 2010. "Building Bridges: Heterogeneous Jurisdictions, Endogenous Spillovers, and the Benefits of Decentralization," GEE Papers, Gabinete de Estratégia e Estudos, Ministério da Economia e da Inovação 0027, Gabinete de Estratégia e Estudos, Ministério da Economia e da Inovação, revised Dec 2010.
  9. Kessler, Anke & Luelfesmann, Christoph & Myers, Gordon M, 2009. "The Architecture of Federations: Constitutions, Bargaining, and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7244, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Septimiu-Rare? SZABO, 2013. "Decentralisation In The Context Of Multi-Level Governance: Study Case - Romania," Proceedings of Administration and Public Management International Conference, Research Centre in Public Administration and Public Services, Bucharest, Romania, Research Centre in Public Administration and Public Services, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 9(1), pages 92-103, June.

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