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Disguised pollution: Industrial activities in the dark

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Listed:
  • Agarwal, Sumit
  • Han, Yajie
  • Qin, Yu
  • Zhu, Hongjia

Abstract

In this study we investigate disguised pollution by industrial firms in China. We find that sulfur dioxide (SO2) readings increase by 10.8% in air pollution monitoring stations four hours after sunset in high factory density areas, controlling for station-year, date, and city-hour fixed effects. Physical inspections by the Ministry of Environmental Protection may only temporarily reduce disguised pollution, suggesting that reliance on physical inspections to enforce regulations is ineffective if firms can shift production activities to non-daylight hours. We show that direct monitoring, as is done with some large polluters in China, can prevent this and should be cost-effective to extend to all industrial polluters.

Suggested Citation

  • Agarwal, Sumit & Han, Yajie & Qin, Yu & Zhu, Hongjia, 2023. "Disguised pollution: Industrial activities in the dark," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:223:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723000865
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104904
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Air pollution; Disguised behavior; Industrial firm; Inspections; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis

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