Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Profit maximization, industry structure, and competition: A critique of neoclassical theory

Contents:

Author Info

  • Keen, Steve
  • Standish, Russell

Abstract

Neoclassical economics has two theories of competition between profit-maximizing firms—Marshallian and Cournot–Nash—that start from different premises about the degree of strategic interaction between firms, yet reach the same result, that market price falls as the number of firms in an industry increases. The Marshallian argument is strictly false. We integrate the different premises, and establish that the optimal level of strategic interaction between competing firms is zero. Simulations support our analysis and reveal intriguing emergent behaviors.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437106004456
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications.

Volume (Year): 370 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 81-85

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:370:y:2006:i:1:p:81-85

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/physica-a-statistical-mechpplications/

Related research

Keywords: Microeconomics; Profit maximization; Competition; Monopoly; Oligopoly; Cournot–Nash game theory;

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. George J. Stigler, 1957. "Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 1.
  2. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
  3. Keen, Steve, 2004. "Deregulator: Judgment Day for microeconomics," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 109-125, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. André Barreira da Silva Rocha, 2012. "Evolutionary Dynamics of Nationalism and Migration," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/11, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Jun 2012.
  2. Anglin, Paul, 2008. "On the proper behavior of atoms: A comment on a critique," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 387(1), pages 277-280.
  3. Bell, William Paul, 2009. "Adaptive interactive expectations: dynamically modelling profit expectations," MPRA Paper 38260, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Feb 2010.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:370:y:2006:i:1:p:81-85. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.