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On optimal unemployment compensation

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Author Info
Pavoni, Nicola

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBW-4MFTVVK-1/2/1d163f6a3ae96e576f5d8afd28de9084
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 54 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (September)
Pages: 1612-1630
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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:54:y:2007:i:6:p:1612-1630

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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  1. Andreas Pollak, 2004. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Variable Skill Levels," Labor and Demography 0409004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Pavoni, Nicola & Violante, Giovanni L, 2006. "Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs," CEPR Discussion Papers 5937, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Hassler, John & Rodríguez Mora, José V., 2002. "Should UI Benefits Really Fall Over Time?," IZA Discussion Papers 622, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2007. "Optimal Incentives in Dynamic Multiple Project Contracts," Working Papers 2007_2, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Javier Ortega & Laurence Rioux, 2008. "On the Extent of Re-Entitlement Effects in Unemployment Compensation," CEP Discussion Papers dp0846, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Abraham Arpad & Nicola Pavoni, 2004. "Efficient Allocations, with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000138, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Gaure, Simen & Røed, Knut & Westlie, Lars, 2008. "The Impacts of Labor Market Policies on Job Search Behavior and Post-Unemployment Job Quality," Memorandum 22/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Pontus Rendahl, 2007. "Asset Based Unemployment Insurance," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/15, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
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