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Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance

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  • Fuller, David L.

Abstract

A model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed. The model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance. Qualitatively, for some agents, incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non-employment. Calibrating the model to a stylized version of the U.S. economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions. The optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1.94% relative to the current U.S. system, an additional 0.87% of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 62 (2014)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 108-122

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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:62:y:2014:i:c:p:108-122

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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Keywords: Unemployment insurance; Non-participation; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Dynamic contracts;

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