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Outcomes of bargaining and planning in single facility location problems

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  • Kawamori, Tomohiko
  • Yamaguchi, Kazuo

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate a model where, on a tree network, players collectively choose the location of a single public facility by noncooperative alternating-offer bargaining with the unanimity rule. We show the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and the characterization of stationary subgame perfect equilibria. We also show that the equilibrium location converges to the Rawls location (the Rawlsian social welfare maximizer) as the discount factor tends to 1; however, it does not relate to the Weber location (the Benthamite social welfare maximizer).

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 59 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 38-45

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:59:y:2010:i:1:p:38-45

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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Keywords: Tree network Location of public facility Unanimity rule Bargaining Rawls location;

References

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  1. Hansen, Pierre & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1981. "Outcomes of voting and planning : Condorcet, Weber and Rawls locations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, August.
  2. Bandelt, Hans-Jurgen, 1985. "Networks with condorcet solutions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 314-326, June.
  3. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  4. Labbe, Martine, 1985. "Outcomes of voting and planning in single facility location problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 299-313, June.
  5. Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara, 2007. "Bargaining one-dimensional social choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 627-651, November.
  6. Campos Rodriguez, Clara M. & Moreno Perez, Jose A., 2003. "Relaxation of the Condorcet and Simpson conditions in voting location," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 673-683, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Yamaguchi, Kazuo, 2011. "Location of an undesirable facility on a network: A bargaining approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 104-108, September.

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