Strategy-proof estimators for simple regression
AbstractIn this paper we propose a whole class of estimators (âclockwise repeated median estimatorsâ or CRM) for the simple regression model that are immune to manipulation by the agents generating the data. Although strategic considerations affecting the stability of the estimated parameters in regression models have already been studied (the Lucas critique), few efforts have been made to design estimators that are incentive compatible. We find that some well-known robust estimators proposed in the literature like the resistant line method are included in our family. Finally, we also undertake a Monte Carlo study to compare the distribution of some estimators that are robust to data manipulation with the OLS estimators under some specific data manipulation process.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 47 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Other versions of this item:
- Javier Perote Peña & Juan Perote Peña, 2003. "Strategy-Proof Estimators for Simple Regression," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/14, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Salvador Barbera & Matthew Jackson, 1991. "A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods," Discussion Papers 964, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
- Javier Perote & Juan Perote-Peña & Marc Vorsatz, 2012. "Strategic behavior in regressions: an experimental," Working Papers 2012-07, FEDEA.
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