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Independence and discretion in telecommunications regulation: lessons from independent central banks

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  • Stern, Jon
  • Trillas, Francesc

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  • Stern, Jon & Trillas, Francesc, 2003. "Independence and discretion in telecommunications regulation: lessons from independent central banks," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 191-201, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:11:y:2003:i:4:p:191-201
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B, 1995. "Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 9(3), pages 397-423, September.
    2. Brown, Gordon, 2001. "The Conditions for High and Stable Growth and Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(471), pages 30-44, May.
    3. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    4. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sang H. Lee & John Levendis, 2006. "Creation Of A Separate Telecom Regulatory Agency: A Duration Analysis Of Its Time Pattern," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(3), pages 407-417, July.
    2. Stern, J. & Cubbin, J., 2004. "Regulatory effectiveness: the impact of regulation and regulatory governance arrangements on electricity industry outcomes: a review paper," Working Papers 04/01, Department of Economics, City University London.
    3. Joan Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez, 2008. "The drivers of antitrust effectiveness," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 185(2), pages 69-88, July.
    4. Maiorano, F. & Stern, J., 2007. "Institutions and investment in low and middle-income countries: the case of mobile communications," Working Papers 07/06, Department of Economics, City University London.
    5. Maiorano, Federica & Stern, Jon, 2007. "Institutions and telecommunications infrastructure in low and middle-income countries: The case of mobile telephony," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 165-181, September.
    6. 'Ofa, Siope Vakataki, 2009. "The WTO's telecommunications commitments and the credibility of telecommunications regulatory reforms in small island developing states," MPRA Paper 66184, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. repec:gig:joupla:v:2:y:2010:i:1:p:3-30 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Balazs Egert, 2009. "Infrastructure Investment in Network Industries: The Role of Incentive Regulation and Regulatory Independence," CESifo Working Paper Series 2642, CESifo.
    9. Gual Jordi & Trillas Francesc, 2006. "Telecommunications Policies: Measurement and Determinants," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 1-24, June.
    10. Stern, Jon & Cubbin, John, 2005. "Regulatory effectiveness : the impact of regulation and regulatory governance arrangements on electricity industry outcomes," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3536, The World Bank.
    11. Işık D. Özel & Aslı Unan, 2021. "Decoupling trends: Drivers of agency independence in telecommunications: An analysis of high and middle‐income countries," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(1), pages 32-62, January.

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