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Infrastructure Investment in Network industries: The Role of Incentive Regulation and Regulatory Independence

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  • Balázs Égert

    (OECD)

Abstract

This paper finds that coherent regulatory policies can boost investment in network industries of OECD economies. Rate-of-return regulation is generally thought to result in overinvestment, while incentive regulation is believed to entail underinvestment. Yet, previous empirical work has generally found that the introduction of incentive regulation has not systematically changed investment in network industries. According to the theoretical literature, regulatory uncertainty exposes both types of regimes to the danger of underinvestment. However, regulatory uncertainty is arguably higher under rate-of-return regulation because investment decisions (what can be included in the rate base) are usually evaluated in a discretionary manner, while firms operating under incentive regulation are less affected by this behaviour. In addition, incentive regulation encourages investment in cost-reducing technologies. Using Bayesian model averaging techniques, this paper shows that incentive regulation implemented jointly with an independent sector regulator (indicating lower regulatory uncertainty) has a strong positive impact on investment in network industries. In addition, lower barriers to entry are also found to encourage sectoral investment. These results support the importance of implementing policies in a coherent framework. L'investissement dans les industries de réseaux : Le rôle de la régulation incitative et de l'indépendance du régulateur sectoriel Ce document montre que des politiques de régulation cohérentes peuvent encourager l’investissement dans les industries de réseaux. Il est généralement admis que la régulation par le taux de rendement a tendance à causer un surinvestissement, tandis qu’une régulation incitative pourrait produire une situation de sous-investissement. Pourtant, la littérature empirique montre que l’introduction de régimes recourant à l’incitation n’a pas, de manière générale, impacté l’investissement dans les industries de réseaux. D’après la littérature théorique, l’incertitude réglementaire accroît le risque d’un sous-investissement dans les deux types de régime. L’incertitude réglementaire est cependant plus élevée dans un régime par le taux de rendement en raison des décisions discrétionnaires d’investissement (éventuellement inclus dans la base du taux de rendement), alors que les entreprises dans un régime incitatif sont moins affectées par ce genre de décisions. De plus, la régulation incitative favorise l’investissement dans les technologies visant à réduire les coûts. Par des techniques d’estimation bayesienne, ce papier montre qu’une régulation incitative mise en place en même temps qu’un régulateur sectoriel indépendant influence positivement l’investissement dans les industries de réseaux. De plus, la réduction des barrières à l’entrée encourage, elle aussi, l’investissement. Ces résultats soulignent l’importance de la mise en oeuvre cohérente des politiques sectorielles.

Suggested Citation

  • Balázs Égert, 2009. "Infrastructure Investment in Network industries: The Role of Incentive Regulation and Regulatory Independence," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 688, OECD Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:688-en
    DOI: 10.1787/225261508320
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    Cited by:

    1. Balázs Égert, 2018. "Regulation, Institutions and Aggregate Investment: New Evidence from OECD Countries," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 415-449, April.
    2. Andreas Kappeler, 2015. "Estonia: Raising Productivity and Benefitting more from Openness," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1215, OECD Publishing.
    3. Carlo Cambini & Yossi Spiegel, 2016. "Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 487-515, April.
    4. Rabah Arezki & Vianney Dequiedt & Rachel Yuting Fan & Carlo Maria Rossotto, 2021. "Liberalization, Technology Adoption, and Stock Returns: Evidence from Telecom," Working Papers hal-03174354, HAL.
    5. Ingo Vogelsang, 2012. "Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change," Chapters, in: Gerald R. Faulhaber & Gary Madden & Jeffrey Petchey (ed.), Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Balázs Égert, 2021. "Investment in OECD Countries: a Primer," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(2), pages 200-223, June.
    7. Carlo Cambini & Laura Rondi, 2011. "Independence, Investment and Political Interference: Evidence from the European Union," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/42, European University Institute.
    8. Tahvanainen, Kaisa & Honkapuro, Samuli & Partanen, Jarmo & Viljainen, Satu, 2012. "Experiences of modern rate of return regulation in Finland," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 32-39.
    9. Poudineh, Rahmatallah & Jamasb, Tooraj, 2016. "Determinants of investment under incentive regulation: The case of the Norwegian electricity distribution networks," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 193-202.
    10. Avdasheva, Svetlana & Orlova, Yulia, 2020. "Effects of long-term tariff regulation on investments under low credibility of rules: Rate-of-return and price cap in Russian electricity grids," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    11. Biancardi, Andrea & Di Castelnuovo, Matteo & Staffell, Iain, 2021. "A framework to evaluate how European Transmission System Operators approach innovation," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    12. Matschoss, Patrick & Bayer, Benjamin & Thomas, Heiko & Marian, Adela, 2019. "The German incentive regulation and its practical impact on the grid integration of renewable energy systems," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 727-738.
    13. Bernardo Bortolotti & Carlo Cambini & Laura Rondi, 2011. "Regulatory Independence, Ownership and Firm Value: The Role of Political Institutions," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/43, European University Institute.
    14. Cambini, Carlo & Rondi, Laura, 2010. "Regulatory Independence and Political Interference: Evidence from EU Mixed-Ownership Utilities’ Investment and Debt," Institutions and Markets Papers 91002, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    15. Cullmann, Astrid & Nieswand, Maria, 2016. "Regulation and investment incentives in electricity distribution: An empirical assessment," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 192-203.
    16. Jacques Pelkmans & Lionel Kapff, 2010. "Interconnector Investment for a Well-functioning Internal Market. What EU regime of regulatory incentives?," Bruges European Economic Research Papers 18, European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe.
    17. Balázs Egert, 2017. "Regulation, Institutions and Productivity: New Macroeconomic Evidence From OECD Countries," Working Papers hal-04141655, HAL.
    18. Carlo Cambini & Raffaele Congiu & Golnoush Soroush, 2020. "Regulation, Innovation, and Systems Integration: Evidence from the EU," Energies, MDPI, vol. 13(7), pages 1-18, April.
    19. Spiegel, Yossi & Cambini, Carlo, 2011. "Investment and capital structure of partially private regulated firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 8508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Michael Funke & Marc Gronwald, 2009. "A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 2692, CESifo.
    21. Reynaud, Arnaud & Thomas, Alban, 2013. "Firm's profitability and regulation in water and network industries: An empirical analysis," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 48-58.
    22. Peter Jarrett, 2012. "The Long-term Outlook for Productivity and Per Capita Income Growth for Canada: A Comparison with Selected G-20 Countries," International Productivity Monitor, Centre for the Study of Living Standards, vol. 24, pages 85-96, Fall.
    23. Åsa Johansson & Yvan Guillemette & Fabrice Murtin & David Turner & Giuseppe Nicoletti & Christine de la Maisonneuve & Guillaume Bousquet & Francesca Spinelli, 2012. "Looking to 2060: Long-Term Global Growth Prospects: A Going for Growth Report," OECD Economic Policy Papers 3, OECD Publishing.
    24. Balázs Égert & Antoine Goujard, 2014. "Strengthening Competition in Poland," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1125, OECD Publishing.
    25. Cambini, Carlo & Franzi, Donata, 2013. "Independent regulatory agencies and rules harmonization for the electricity sector and renewables in the Mediterranean region," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 179-191.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cost-plus regulation; incentive regulation; industries de réseaux; indépendance réglementaire; investissement; investment; network industries; price cap; rate-of-return regulation; regulatory independence; régulation; régulation incitative; régulation par le taux de rendement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy

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