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The takeover of Enersis: the control of privatized utilities

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  • Trillas, Francesc

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Utilities Policy.

Volume (Year): 10 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 25-45

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Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:10:y:2001:i:1:p:25-45

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30478

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  1. Bradley, Michael & Desai, Anand & Kim, E. Han, 1988. "Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 3-40, May.
  2. Roll, Richard, 1986. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 197-216, April.
  3. Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, 1990. "Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 3(2), pages 60-69.
  4. Germa Manel Bel Queralt, 1999. "Share issue privatization and political objectives: do governments make a difference?," Working Papers in Economics 56, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  5. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
  6. Dann, Larry Y. & DeAngelo, Harry, 1988. "Corporate financial policy and corporate control : A study of defensive adjustments in asset and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 87-127, January.
  7. Jensen, Michael C, 1988. "Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 21-48, Winter.
  8. Ruback, Richard S, 1983. " The Cities Service Takeover: A Case Study," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(2), pages 319-30, May.
  9. Mitchell, Mark L & Lehn, Kenneth, 1990. "Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 372-98, April.
  10. Gillan, Stuart L. & Kensinger, John W. & Martin, John D., 2000. "Value creation and corporate diversification: the case of Sears, Roebuck & Co," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 103-137, January.
  11. Baker, George P, 1992. " Beatrice: A Study in the Creation and Destruction of Value," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 1081-119, July.
  12. McLaughlin, Robyn M & Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Regulation and the Market for Corporate Control: Hostile Tender Offers for Electric and Gas Utilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 181-204, September.
  13. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Luigi Zingales, 1996. "Corporate Ownership Structures: Private versus Social Optimality," NBER Working Papers 5584, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
  1. Bel, Germà & Trillas, Francesc, 2005. "Privatization, corporate control and regulatory reform: the case of Telefonica," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-51, February.
  2. John J. García & Francesc Trillas, 2013. "European energy industry shocks, corporate control and firms' value," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO CIEF 010928, UNIVERSIDAD EAFIT.
  3. John J. García & Francesc Trillas, 2012. "Regulatory Reform and Corporate Control in European Energy Industries," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO CIEF 010664, UNIVERSIDAD EAFIT.

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