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Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?

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Author Info
Mitchell, Mark L
Lehn, Kenneth
Abstract

This paper empirically examines one motive for takeovers: to change control of firms that make acquisitions that diminish the value of their equity. Firms that subsequently become takeover targets make acquisitions that significantly reduce their equity value, and firms that do not become takeover targets make acquisitions that raise their equity value. Within the sample of acquisitions by targets, the acquisitions that reduce equity value the most are those that are later divested either in bust-up takeovers or restructuring programs to thwart the takeover. This evidence is consistent with theories advanced by Robin Marris (1963), Henry G. Manne (1965), and Michael C. Jensen (1986) concerning the disciplinary role played by takeovers. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 98 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 372-98
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:98:y:1990:i:2:p:372-98

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  1. Steven N. Kaplan & Mark L. Mitchell & Karen H. Wruck, 1997. "A Clinical Exploration of Value Creation and Destruction in Acquisitions: Organizational Design, Incentives, and Internal Capital Markets," NBER Working Papers 5999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Martynova, Marina & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2006. "Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe," Discussion Paper 3, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Rajeeva Sinha, 2004. "The role of hostile takeovers in corporate governance," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(18), pages 1291-1305, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner & David Scharfstein, 2003. "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER Working Papers 9816, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Matthew Higgins & Daniel Rodriguez, 2003. "The outsourcing of R&D through acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry," Emory Economics 0324, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Jong, A. de & Poel, A.M. van der & Wolfswinkel, M., 2007. "Corporate Governance and Acquisitions: Acquirer Wealth Effects in the Netherlands," Research Paper ERS-2007-016-F&A Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
  7. Carolyn Carroll & John Griffith, 2008. "The retention of CEOs that make poor acquisitions," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 226-242, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. David A. Butz, 1993. "Debt Financing and Manager-Shareholder Agency Costs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 687, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. David Neumark & Steven A. Sharpe, 1992. "Hostile Takeovers and Expropriation of Extramarginal Wages: A Test," NBER Working Papers 4101, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. David A. Butz, 1991. "Free Cash Flow Theory Without the Free Cash Emphasis," UCLA Economics Working Papers 614, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Piet Eichholtz & Nils Kok, 2008. "How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 141-163, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Steven Kaplan & Michael S. Weisbach, 1992. "The Success of Acquisitions: Evidence From Disvestitures," NBER Working Papers 3484, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Sugata Ray & Missaka Warusawitharana, 2007. "An efficiency perspective on the gains from mergers and asset purchases," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2007-39, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Jyrki Ali-Yrkkö, 2002. "Mergers and Acquisitions - Reasons and Results," Discussion Papers 792, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  15. Lili Qiu, 2004. "Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity," Working Papers 2004-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. William O. Brown, Jr. & Michael T. Maloney, . "Exit, Voice, and the Role of Corporate Directors: Evidence from Acquisition Performance," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-27, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  17. J. Mulherin, 2005. "Corporations, collective action and corporate governance: One size does not fit all," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 179-204, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, 2001. "Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s," NBER Working Papers 8220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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