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Corporate Governance, Competition and Performance

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Author Info
Colin Mayer

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Abstract

The paper examines interrelations between corporate governance, competition and performance. Traditional theories emphasise the importance of managerial incentives and disciplining in corporate governance, and how institutional arrangements affect financing. The paper argues that ownership and control, rather than incentives, disciplining and corporate finance, are the distinguishing features of different financial systems. The insider systems of Continental Europe and Japan may be superior at implementing policies which involve relations with stakeholders. Outsider, Anglo-American, systems may be more responsive to change. Concentration of ownership may be required to establish relations between stakeholders, and this may impede product market competition ...


Cet article examine les relations mutuelles entre modes de contrôle des entreprises, concurrence et performance de l’économie. Les théories traditionnelles soulignent l’importance des incitations et de la discipline dans la direction d’entreprise, ainsi que la manière dont les dispositifs institutionneles jouent sur le financement. L’étude soutient que ce sont la propriété et le contrôle, plutôt que les incitations, la discipline et la finance d’entreprise, qui distinguent les différents systèmes financiers. Les systèmes de financement d’Europe continentale et du Japon, qui reposent essentiellement sur le recours aux banques ou à d’autres investisseurs initiés, pourraient s’avérer plus efficaces dans la mise en place de politiques impliquant des relations avec l’ensemble des parties prenantes. De leur côté, les systèmes angloaméricains, ouverts sur les marchés, pourraient être plus réceptifs au changement. Une concentration de la propriété pourrait être nécessaire pour établir des relations entre les parties en présence, et cela pourrait faire obstacle à la concurrence sur les marchés de produits ...

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/536410876068
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Paper provided by OECD, Economics Department in its series OECD Economics Department Working Papers with number 164.

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Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:164-en

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  1. Erik Lehmann & Juergen Weigand, 2000. "Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany," CoFE Discussion Paper 00-05, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz. [Downloadable!]
  2. Thorsten H. Block, 1998. "Financial Market Liberalization and the Changing Character of Corporate Governance," SCEPA Working Papers 1998-08, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School. [Downloadable!]
  3. Block,Thorsten H., 2002. "Financial systems, innovation and economic performance," Research Memoranda 013, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology. [Downloadable!]
  4. Carettoni, A & Manzocchi, S & Padoan, P.C., 2001. "The Growth-Finance Nexus and European Integration. A Review of the Literature," EIFC - Technology and Finance Working Papers 5, United Nations University, Institute for New Technologies. [Downloadable!]
  5. Martin J. Conyon, Simon I. Peck, 1998. "Board size and corporate performance: evidence from European countries," European Journal of Finance, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 291-304, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Tor Eriksson & Erik Strøjer Madsen & Mogens Dilling-Hansen & Valdemar Smith, 2001. "Determinants of CEO and Board Turnover," Empirica, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 243-257, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nicola Cetorelli, 1997. "The role of credit market competition on lending strategies and on capital accumulation," Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation WP-97-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  8. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Ekta Selarka, 2008. "Impact of M&A on firm performance in India: Implications for concentration of ownership and insider entrenchment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp907, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  9. Eduardo Siandra, 1998. "Sistemas de pensiones, sus reformas y los mercados de capitales," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0299, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
  10. Valdemar Smith & Mogens Dilling-Hansen & Tor Eriksson & Erik Strøjer Madsen, 2000. "R&D and Productivity in Danish Firms: Some Empirical Evidence," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  11. S. Deakin & R. Hobbs & S. Konzelmann & F. Wilkinson, 2001. "Partnership, Ownership and Control: The Impact of Corporate Governance on Employment Relations," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp200, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
  12. Thomas Kirchmaier, 2003. "Corporate Restructuring and Firm Performance of British and German Non-Financial Firms," CEP Discussion Papers dp0582, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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