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Corporate Governance, Competition and Performance

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  • Colin Mayer

Abstract

The paper examines interrelations between corporate governance, competition and performance. Traditional theories emphasise the importance of managerial incentives and disciplining in corporate governance, and how institutional arrangements affect financing. The paper argues that ownership and control, rather than incentives, disciplining and corporate finance, are the distinguishing features of different financial systems. The insider systems of Continental Europe and Japan may be superior at implementing policies which involve relations with stakeholders. Outsider, Anglo-American, systems may be more responsive to change. Concentration of ownership may be required to establish relations between stakeholders, and this may impede product market competition ... Cet article examine les relations mutuelles entre modes de contrôle des entreprises, concurrence et performance de l’économie. Les théories traditionnelles soulignent l’importance des incitations et de la discipline dans la direction d’entreprise, ainsi que la manière dont les dispositifs institutionneles jouent sur le financement. L’étude soutient que ce sont la propriété et le contrôle, plutôt que les incitations, la discipline et la finance d’entreprise, qui distinguent les différents systèmes financiers. Les systèmes de financement d’Europe continentale et du Japon, qui reposent essentiellement sur le recours aux banques ou à d’autres investisseurs initiés, pourraient s’avérer plus efficaces dans la mise en place de politiques impliquant des relations avec l’ensemble des parties prenantes. De leur côté, les systèmes angloaméricains, ouverts sur les marchés, pourraient être plus réceptifs au changement. Une concentration de la propriété pourrait être nécessaire pour établir des relations entre les parties en présence, et cela pourrait faire obstacle à la concurrence sur les marchés de produits ...

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/536410876068
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by OECD Publishing in its series OECD Economics Department Working Papers with number 164.

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Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:164-en

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Cited by:
  1. Amit Sachdeva, 2010. "Regulatory competition in European company law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 137-170, October.
  2. S. Deakin & R. Hobbs & S. Konzelmann & F. Wilkinson, 2001. "Partnership, Ownership and Control: The Impact of Corporate Governance on Employment Relations," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp200, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  3. Nicola Cetorelli, 1997. "The role of credit market competition on lending strategies and on capital accumulation," Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation WP-97-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  4. Belloc, Filippo, 2010. "Corporate governance and innovation: an organizational perspective," MPRA Paper 21495, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Eduardo Siandra, 1998. "Sistemas de pensiones, sus reformas y los mercados de capitales," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0299, Department of Economics - dECON.
  6. Tor Eriksson & Erik Strøjer Madsen & Mogens Dilling-Hansen & Valdemar Smith, 2001. "Determinants of CEO and Board Turnover," Empirica, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 243-257, September.
  7. Erik Lehmann & Juergen Weigand, 2000. "Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany," CoFE Discussion Paper 00-05, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
  8. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Ekta Selarka, 2008. "Impact of M&A on firm performance in India: Implications for concentration of ownership and insider entrenchment," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp907, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  9. Thomas Kirchmaier, 2003. "Corporate Restructuring and Firm Performance of British and German Non-Financial Firms," CEP Discussion Papers dp0582, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  10. Carettoni, A & Manzocchi, S & Padoan, P.C., 2001. "The Growth-Finance Nexus and European Integration. A Review of the Literature," EIFC - Technology and Finance Working Papers 5, United Nations University, Institute for New Technologies.
  11. Valdemar Smith & Mogens Dilling-Hansen & Tor Eriksson & Erik Str�jer Madsen, 2004. "R&D and productivity in Danish firms: some empirical evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(16), pages 1797-1806.
  12. Kim, Euysung, 2006. "The impact of family ownership and capital structures on productivity performance of Korean manufacturing firms: Corporate governance and the "chaebol problem"," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 209-233, June.

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