Taxing guns vs. taxing crime: An application of the "market for offenses model"
AbstractThe interaction between offenders and potential victims has so far received relatively little attention in the literature on the economics of crime. The main objective of this paper is twofold: to extend the âmarket for offenses modelâ to deal with both âproductâ and âfactorâ markets, and to apply it to the case where guns are used for crime commission by offenders and for self-protection by potential victims. Our analysis offers new insights about the association between crime and guns and the limits it imposes on the efficacy of law enforcement and regulatory policies aimed to control both crime and guns.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Policy Modeling.
Volume (Year): 32 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505735
Economics of crime Market for offenses Self-protection Law enforcement Regulation Gun control Strategic reactions;
Other versions of this item:
- Isaac Ehrlich & Tetsuya Saito, 2010. "Taxing Guns vs. Taxing Crime: An Application of the “Market for Offenses Model”," NBER Working Papers 16009, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ehrlich, Isaac & Saito, Tetsuya, 2010. "Taxing Guns Vs. Taxing Crime: An Application of The “Market For Offenses Model”," Working paper 587, Regulation2point0.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- H49 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Other
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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