IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/joepsy/v32y2011i3p468-479.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

When social accounts promote acceptance of unfair ultimatum offers: The role of the victim's stress responses to uncertainty and power position

Author

Listed:
  • Dijke, Marius van
  • Cremer, David De

Abstract

We examined which type of social account (denying responsibility versus apologizing) following an unfair offer makes recipients more likely to accept the offer in ultimatum bargaining. We identified stress responses to uncertainty as an individual difference factor that should moderate the relative effectiveness of these social accounts. A denial should make acceptance of an unfair offer more likely among recipients who respond to uncertainty with low stress. An apology should make such acceptance more likely among recipients who respond with high stress. Further, we argued that this cross-over interaction should be observed particularly among recipients interacting with a high power allocator. Two ultimatum bargaining experiments supported these ideas. Employing the perspective of victims of unfairness, the present research identifies a relevant individual difference moderator of the effectiveness of social accounts in bargaining situations and identifies power as a situational variable that promotes the expression of this factor.

Suggested Citation

  • Dijke, Marius van & Cremer, David De, 2011. "When social accounts promote acceptance of unfair ultimatum offers: The role of the victim's stress responses to uncertainty and power position," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 468-479, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:468-479
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487011000547
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schweitzer, Maurice E. & Hershey, John C. & Bradlow, Eric T., 2006. "Promises and lies: Restoring violated trust," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 1-19, September.
    2. Curley, Shawn P. & Yates, J. Frank & Abrams, Richard A., 1986. "Psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 230-256, October.
    3. Blount, Sally, 1995. "When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 131-144, August.
    4. Fellner, Gerlinde & Guth, Werner, 2003. "What limits escalation?--Varying threat power in an ultimatum experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 53-60, July.
    5. Suleiman, Ramzi, 1996. "Expectations and fairness in a modified Ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 531-554, November.
    6. Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald, 1996. "Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 100-110, March.
    7. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    8. De Cremer, David & van Dijk, Eric & Pillutla, Madan M., 2010. "Explaining Unfair Offers in Ultimatum Games and their Effects on Trust: An Experimental Approach," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 107-126, January.
    9. W. Guth & R. Schmittberger & B. Schwartz, 2010. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 291, David K. Levine.
    10. Penninx, Brenda W. J. H. & Van Tilburg, Theo & Deeg, Dorly J. H. & Kriegsman, Didi M. W. & Boeke, A. Joan P. & Van Eijk, Jacques T. M., 1997. "Direct and buffer effects of social support and personal coping resources in individuals with arthritis," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 393-402, February.
    11. Kuhn, Kristine M., 1997. "Communicating Uncertainty: Framing Effects on Responses to Vague Probabilities," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 55-83, July.
    12. Pillutla, Madan M. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 1996. "Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 208-224, December.
    13. Robert, Christopher & Carnevale, Peter J., 1997. "Group Choice in Ultimatum Bargaining," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 256-279, November.
    14. Kim, Peter H. & Dirks, Kurt T. & Cooper, Cecily D. & Ferrin, Donald L., 2006. "When more blame is better than less: The implications of internal vs. external attributions for the repair of trust after a competence- vs. integrity-based trust violation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 49-65, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. David Cooper & John Lightle, 2013. "The gift of advice: communication in a bilateral gift exchange game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 443-477, December.
    2. Tucker, Danielle A. & Hendy, Jane & Barlow, James, 2016. "The dynamic nature of social accounts: An examination of how interpretive processes impact on account effectiveness," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 6079-6087.
    3. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    4. Steven L. Grover & Marie-Aude Abid-Dupont & Caroline Manville & Markus C. Hasel, 2019. "Repairing Broken Trust Between Leaders and Followers: How Violation Characteristics Temper Apologies," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 853-870, March.
    5. Elias L Khalil & Nick Feltovich, 2018. "Moral licensing, instrumental apology and insincerity aversion: Taking Immanuel Kant to the lab," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(11), pages 1-24, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. De Cremer, David, 2010. "To pay or to apologize? On the psychology of dealing with unfair offers in a dictator game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 843-848, December.
    2. Desmet, Pieter T.M. & Cremer, David De & Dijk, Eric van, 2011. "In money we trust? The use of financial compensations to repair trust in the aftermath of distributive harm," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 75-86, March.
    3. Koning, Lukas & Steinel, Wolfgang & Beest, Ilja van & Dijk, Eric van, 2011. "Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 35-42, May.
    4. Binmore, Ken & McCarthy, John & Ponti, Giovanni & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 2002. "A Backward Induction Experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 48-88, May.
    5. Hong, Kessely & Bohnet, Iris, 2007. "Status and distrust: The relevance of inequality and betrayal aversion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 197-213, April.
    6. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," IEW - Working Papers 075, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Emmanuel PETIT, 2009. "Emotion and economic decision in the ultimatum game (In French)," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2009-03, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
    8. Katarína Danková & Hodaka Morita & Maroš Servátka & Le Zhang, 2022. "Fairness concerns and job assignment to positions with different surplus," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(4), pages 1490-1516, April.
    9. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    10. Nicklisch, Andreas & Wolff, Irenaeus, 2012. "On the nature of reciprocity: Evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 892-905.
    11. Aina, Chiara & Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Gamba, Astrid, 2020. "Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 150-167.
    12. Matthew Rabin., 1997. "Bargaining Structure, Fairness and Efficiency," Economics Working Papers E00-280, University of California at Berkeley.
    13. Xiao, Erte & Bicchieri, Cristina, 2010. "When equality trumps reciprocity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 456-470, June.
    14. Leunissen, Joost M. & Cremer, David De & Reinders Folmer, Christopher P., 2012. "An instrumental perspective on apologizing in bargaining: The importance of forgiveness to apologize," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 215-222.
    15. Cappelletti, Dominique & Güth, Werner & Ploner, Matteo, 2011. "Being of two minds: Ultimatum offers under cognitive constraints," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 940-950.
    16. Andreoni, James & Brown, Paul M. & Vesterlund, Lise, 2002. "What Makes an Allocation Fair? Some Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, July.
    17. Charness, Gary B & Brandts, Jordi, 2002. "Instituto de Análisis Económico," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt2rf5p3rs, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    18. Elbittar Alexander & Gomberg Andrei & Sour Laura, 2011. "Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-33, August.
    19. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
    20. Bardhan, Pranab & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 2000. "Wealth inequality, wealth constraints and economic performance," Handbook of Income Distribution, in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 541-603, Elsevier.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:468-479. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.