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Misperception of chance and loss repair: On the dynamics of tax compliance

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  • Maciejovsky, Boris
  • Kirchler, Erich
  • Schwarzenberger, Herbert

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Psychology.

Volume (Year): 28 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 678-691

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Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:678-691

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Friedland, Nehemiah & Maital, Shlomo & Rutenberg, Aryeh, 1978. "A simulation study of income tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 107-116, August.
  2. Alm, James & Sanchez, Isabel & de Juan, Ana, 1995. "Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 3-18.
  3. repec:att:wimass:9610 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Hasseldine, John & Hite, Peggy A., 2003. "Framing, gender and tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 517-533, August.
  5. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
  6. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  7. Spicer, Michael W. & Thomas, J. Everett, 1982. "Audit probabilities and the tax evasion decision: An experimental approach," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 241-245, September.
  8. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March.
  9. Srinivasan, T. N., 1973. "Tax evasion: A model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 339-346.
  10. Antonides, Gerrit & Robben, Henry S. J., 1995. "True positives and false alarms in the detection of tax evasion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 617-640, December.
  11. Kirchler, Erich & Maciejovsky, Boris, 2002. " Simultaneous Over- and Underconfidence: Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 65-85, July.
  12. Kirchler, Erich & Maciejovsky, Boris, 2001. "Tax compliance within the context of gain and loss situations, expected and current asset position, and profession," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 173-194, April.
  13. Ralph-C Bayer, 2003. "A Contest with the Taxman: The Impact of Tax Rates on Tax Evasion and Wastefully Invested Resources," School of Economics Working Papers 2003-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  14. Torgler, Benno, 2002. " Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 657-83, December.
  15. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 103-121, June.
  16. Baldry, Jonathan C, 1987. "Income Tax Evasion and the Tax Schedule: Some Experimental Results," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 42(3), pages 357-83.
  17. Mittone, Luigi, 2006. "Dynamic behaviour in tax evasion: An experimental approach," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 813-835, October.
  18. Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  19. Spicer, Michael W. & Hero, Rodney E., 1985. "Tax evasion and heuristics : A research note," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 263-267, March.
  20. Spicer, M W & Lundstedt, S B, 1976. "Understanding Tax Evasion," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 31(2), pages 295-305.
  21. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H & Schulze, William D, 1999. "Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 141-71.
  22. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June.
  23. Webley, Paul, 1987. "Audit probabilities and tax evasion in a business simulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 267-270.
  24. Francesco Guala & Luigi Mittone, 2005. "Experiments in economics: External validity and the robustness of phenomena," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 495-515.
  25. Schepanski, A. & Shearer, T., 1995. "A Prospect Theory Account of the Income Tax Withholding Phenomenon," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 174-186, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Fellner, Gerlinde & Maciejovsky, Boris, 2007. "Risk attitude and market behavior: Evidence from experimental asset markets," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 338-350, June.
  2. Gemmell, Norman & Ratto, Marisa, 2012. "Behavioral Responses To Taxpayer Audits: Evidence From Random Taxpayer Inquiries," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 65(1), pages 33-57, March Cit.
  3. Zhixin Dai & Robin M. Hogarth & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Ambiguity on audits and cooperation in a public goods game," Working Papers 1403, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  4. Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Kocher, 2013. "Tax compliance under tax regime changes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 225-246, April.
  5. Kastlunger, Barbara & Kirchler, Erich & Mittone, Luigi & Pitters, Julia, 2009. "Sequences of audits, tax compliance, and taxpaying strategies," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 405-418, June.
  6. McKee, Michael & Siladke, Caleb & Vossler, Christian A., 2011. "Behavioral dynamics of tax compliance under an information services initiative," MPRA Paper 38865, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Stefura Gabriela, 2012. "The Role of Opportunity, Taxpayers’ Perceptions and Demographic Differences in Tax Compliance Analysis," Annals - Economic and Administrative Series -, Faculty of Business and Administration, University of Bucharest, vol. 6(1), pages 163-177, December.
  8. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
  9. Dai, Zhixin & Hogarth, Robin M. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014. "Ambiguity on Audits and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game," IZA Discussion Papers 7932, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Hashimzade, Nigar & Myles, Gareth D. & Page, Frank & Rablen, Matthew D., 2014. "Social networks and occupational choice: The endogenous formation of attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 134-146.
  11. Bernasconi, Michele & Corazzini, Luca & Seri, Raffaello, 2014. "Reference dependent preferences, hedonic adaptation and tax evasion: Does the tax burden matter?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 103-118.
  12. Michele Bernasconi, Luca Corazzini, Raffaello Seri, 2012. "Tax Evasion: Does the Tax Burden Matter?," ISLA Working Papers 43, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  13. Zhixin Dai & Robin M. Hogarth & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Ambiguity on audits and cooperation in a public goods game," Working Papers halshs-00944500, HAL.

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