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Do status incentives undermine morality-based status attainment? Investigating the mediating role of perceived authenticity

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  • Bai, Feng
  • Ho, Grace Ching Chi
  • Liu, Wu

Abstract

We propose that status incentives weaken the relationship between moral behaviors and status conferral by undermining perceptions of authenticity. Across two experiments among diverse samples of participants, evidence indicates that observers question the authenticity of moral actors who are pursuing status incentives. Perceptions of authenticity mediate the interaction of moral behaviors and status incentives on status conferral. A third two-wave online survey replicates the experimental findings and reveals that observers’ moral identity further strengthens the interaction of moral behaviors and status incentives in shaping perceptions of authenticity and subsequent status conferral.

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  • Bai, Feng & Ho, Grace Ching Chi & Liu, Wu, 2020. "Do status incentives undermine morality-based status attainment? Investigating the mediating role of perceived authenticity," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 126-138.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:158:y:2020:i:c:p:126-138
    DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.04.005
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