Optimal labor contracts with non-contractible human capital
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of the Japanese and International Economies.
Volume (Year): 3 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622903
Other versions of this item:
- Kanemoto, Y. & Macleod, B., 1989. "Optimal Labor Contracts With Non-Contractible Human Capital," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 116-89, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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