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Conflicts of interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors

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  • Ljungqvist, Alexander
  • Marston, Felicia
  • Starks, Laura T.
  • Wei, Kelsey D.
  • Yan, Hong

Abstract

Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or brokerage pressure in stocks highly visible to institutional investors. Examining a comprehensive sample of analyst recommendations over the 1994-2000 period, we find that analysts’ recommendations relative to consensus are positively associated with investment banking relationships and brokerage pressure, but negatively associated with the presence of institutional investor owners. The presence of institutional investors is also associated with more accurate earnings forecasts and more timely re-ratings following severe share price falls.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 85 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 420-456

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:85:y:2007:i:2:p:420-456

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hugon, Artur & Muslu, Volkan, 2010. "Market demand for conservative analysts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 42-57, May.
  2. Grullon, Gustavo & Underwood, Shane & Weston, James P., 2014. "Comovement and investment banking networks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 73-89.
  3. Xu, Nianhang & Jiang, Xuanyu & Chan, Kam C. & Yi, Zhihong, 2013. "Analyst coverage, optimism, and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 217-239.
  4. Simona Mola & Massimo Guidolin, 2006. "Why do analysts continue to provide favorable coverage for seasoned stocks?," Working Papers 2006-034, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  5. Mehran, Hamid & Stulz, Rene M., 2007. "The economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 267-296, August.
  6. Stéphane Rousseau, 2012. "A Question of Credibility: Enhancing the Accountability and Effectiveness of Credit Rating Agencies," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 356, July.
  7. Adolfo Barajas & Mario Catalán, 2011. "Market Discipline and Conflicts of Interest Between Banks and Pension Funds," IMF Working Papers 11/282, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Chang, Chih-Hsiang & Chan, Kam C., 2011. "Investment banks' stock ratings, call warrant issuance, and responses from heterogeneous investors: Evidence from Taiwan," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 733-743, October.
  9. Brown, Nerissa C. & Wei, Kelsey D. & Wermers, Russ, 2007. "Analyst recommendations, mutual fund herding, and overreaction in stock prices," CFR Working Papers 07-08, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
  10. Simona Mola & Massimo Guidolin, 2007. "Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism," Working Papers 2007-017, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  11. Fernando, Chitru S. & Gatchev, Vladimir A. & Spindt, Paul A., 2012. "Institutional ownership, analyst following, and share prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2175-2189.
  12. Jordan, Bradford D. & Liu, Mark H. & Wu, Qun, 2012. "Do investment banks listen to their own analysts?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1452-1463.
  13. Koch, Christopher & Schmidt, Carsten, 2010. "Disclosing conflicts of interest - Do experience and reputation matter?," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 95-107, January.
  14. Burns, Natasha & Kedia, Simi & Lipson, Marc, 2010. "Institutional ownership and monitoring: Evidence from financial misreporting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 443-455, September.
  15. Walter Boudry & Jarl Kallberg & Crocker Liu, 2011. "Analyst Behavior and Underwriter Choice," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 5-38, July.
  16. Fernando, Chitru S. & Gatchev, Vladimir A. & Spindt, Paul A., 2010. "Institutional Ownership, Analyst Following and Share Prices," Working Papers 10-07, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
  17. Franck, Alexander & Kerl, Alexander, 2013. "Analyst forecasts and European mutual fund trading," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 2677-2692.
  18. Song, Kyojik “Roy” & Mantecon, Tomas & Altintig, Z. Ayca, 2012. "Chaebol-affiliated analysts: Conflicts of interest and market responses," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 584-596.

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