IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/joares/v43y2005i4p623-650.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Analyst Impartiality and Investment Banking Relationships

Author

Listed:
  • PATRICIA C. O'BRIEN
  • MAUREEN F. MCNICHOLS
  • LIN HSIOU‐WEI

Abstract

This study examines whether investment banking ties influence the speed with which analysts convey unfavorable news. We hypothesize that affiliated analysts have incentives to respond promptly to good news but prefer not to issue bad news about client companies. Using duration models of the time between an equity issue and the first downgrade, we find affiliated analysts are slower to downgrade from Buy and Hold recommendations and significantly faster to upgrade from Hold recommendations, in both within‐analyst and within‐issuer tests. We also find affiliated analysts issue recommendations sooner and more frequently after an offering than unaffiliated analysts, and that unaffiliated analysts are more likely than affiliated analysts to drop coverage of sample firms. Our findings indicate that banking ties increase analysts' reluctance to reveal negative news, and that reform efforts must carefully consider the incentives of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts to initiate coverage and convey the results of their research.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia C. O'Brien & Maureen F. Mcnichols & Lin Hsiou‐Wei, 2005. "Analyst Impartiality and Investment Banking Relationships," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 623-650, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:43:y:2005:i:4:p:623-650
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2005.00184.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2005.00184.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2005.00184.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-686.
    2. Lin, Hsiou-wei & McNichols, Maureen F., 1998. "Underwriting relationships, analysts' earnings forecasts and investment recommendations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 101-127, February.
    3. Hsuan‐Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, 2000. "The Seven Percent Solution," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1105-1131, June.
    4. Alan Greenspan, 2002. "Corporate governance," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 3(03), pages 3-6, October.
    5. Daniel J. Bradley & Bradford D. Jordan & Jay R. Ritter, 2003. "The Quiet Period Goes out with a Bang," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 1-36, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jeon, Jin Q. & Lee, Cheolwoo & Nasser, Tareque & Via, M. Tony, 2015. "Multiple lead underwriter IPOs and firm visibility," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 128-149.
    2. James, Christopher & Karceski, Jason, 2006. "Strength of analyst coverage following IPOs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 1-34, October.
    3. Sebastián Nieto-Parra, 2009. "Who Saw Sovereign Debt Crises Coming?," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2009), pages 125-169, August.
    4. Dambra, Michael & Field, Laura Casares & Gustafson, Matthew T. & Pisciotta, Kevin, 2018. "The consequences to analyst involvement in the IPO process: Evidence surrounding the JOBS Act," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 302-330.
    5. François Degeorge & François Derrien & Kent L. Womack, 2004. "Quid Pro Quo in IPOs: Why Book-building is Dominating Auctions," Working Papers 2004.150, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. Niehaus, Greg & Zhang, Donghang, 2010. "The impact of sell-side analyst research coverage on an affiliated broker's market share of trading volume," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 776-787, April.
    7. Mola, Simona & Guidolin, Massimo, 2009. "Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 108-137, July.
    8. Vesa Pursiainen, 2022. "Cultural Biases in Equity Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 163-211, February.
    9. Ting Chen & Xiumin Martin, 2011. "Do Bank‐Affiliated Analysts Benefit from Lending Relationships?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 633-675, June.
    10. James C. Spindler, 2006. "Conflict or Credibility: Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the Market for Underwriting Business," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 303-325, June.
    11. Malmendier, Ulrike M. & Shanthikumar, Devin, 2004. "Are Investors Naive about Incentives?," Research Papers 1867, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    12. Jegadeesh, Narasimhan & Kim, Woojin, 2006. "Value of analyst recommendations: International evidence," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 274-309, August.
    13. Juyoun Ryoo & Cheolwoo Lee & Jin Q Jeon, 2020. "Sustainability of Analyst Recommendations in Multiple Lead Underwriter IPOs," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(5), pages 1-36, March.
    14. Massimo Guidolin & Simona Mola, 2006. "Why do analysts continue to provide favorable coverage for seasoned stocks?," Working Papers 2006-034, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    15. Bradley, Daniel, 2018. "Discussion of “analyst stock ownership and stock recommendations”," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 499-505.
    16. Daniel Bradley & Xi Liu & Christos Pantzalis, 2014. "Bucking the Trend: The Informativeness of Analyst Contrarian Recommendations," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 43(2), pages 391-414, June.
    17. Carter, Richard B. & Strader, Troy J., 2009. "The market versus the analyst: Biases and predictive ability," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 398-416, May.
    18. Alexander Ljungqvist & Felicia Marston & William J. Wilhelm, 2006. "Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 301-340, February.
    19. Paul Oyer, 2006. "The Making of an Investment Banker: Macroeconomic Shocks, Career Choice, and Lifetime Income," NBER Working Papers 12059, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Malmendier, Ulrike & Shanthikumar, Devin, 2007. "Are small investors naive about incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 457-489, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:43:y:2005:i:4:p:623-650. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-8456 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.