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Quid Pro Quo in IPOs: Why Book-Building is Dominating Auctions

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Author Info
Degeorge, François
Derrien, Francois
Womack, Kent L

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Abstract

The book-building procedure for selling initial public offerings to investors has captured significant market share from auction alternatives in recent years, despite significantly lower costs in both direct fees and initial underpricing when using the auction mechanism. This Paper shows that in the French market, where the frequency of book-building and auctions was about equal in the 1990s, the ostensible advantages to the issuer using book-building were advertising-related quid pro quo benefits. Specifically, we find that book-built issues were more likely to be followed and positively recommended by the lead underwriters and were also more likely to receive ‘booster shots’ post-issuance if the shares had fallen. Even non-underwriters’ analysts appear to promote book-built issues more, but only when their underwriters stood to gain from acquiring shares in future issues from the recommended firm’s lead underwriter. Book-built issues also appeared to garner more press in general (but only after they had chosen book-building, not before). Yet, we do not observe valuation or return differentials to suggest these types of promotion have any value to the issuing firm. We conclude that underwriters using the book-building procedure have convinced issuers of the questionable value of advertising and promotion of their shares.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4462.

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Date of creation: Jun 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4462

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Related research
Keywords: auctions; book building; IPOs;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-86.
  2. FranÁois Derrien & Kent L. Womack, 2003. "Auctions vs. Bookbuilding and the Control of Underpricing in Hot IPO Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(1), pages 31-61.
  3. Dunbar, Craig G., 2000. "Factors affecting investment bank initial public offering market share," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 3-41, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Krigman, Laurie & Shaw, Wayne H. & Womack, Kent L., 2001. "Why do firms switch underwriters?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 245-284, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Daniel J. Bradley & Bradford D. Jordan & Jay R. Ritter, 2008. "Analyst Behavior Following IPOs: The 'Bubble Period' Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(1), pages 101-133, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Habib, Michel A & Ljungqvist, Alexander P, 2001. "Underpricing and Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses in IPOs: Theory and Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(2), pages 433-58.
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  7. Ljungqvist, Alexander P & Marston, Felicia & Wilhelm Jr, William J, 2003. "Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations," CEPR Discussion Papers 4162, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Kenji Kutsuna, 2004. "Why Does Book Building Drive Out Auction Methods of IPO Issuance? Evidence from Japan," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(4), pages 1129-1166. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Aggarwal, Rajesh K. & Krigman, Laurie & Womack, Kent L., 2002. "Strategic IPO underpricing, information momentum, and lockup expiration selling," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 105-137, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, 2000. "The Seven Percent Solution," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1105-1131, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Daniel J. Bradley & Bradford D. Jordan & Jay R. Ritter, 2003. "The Quiet Period Goes out with a Bang," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 1-36, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Biais, Bruno & Bossaerts, Peter & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2002. "An Optimal IPO Mechanism," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(1), pages 117-46, January.
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  13. Womack, Kent L, 1996. " Do Brokerage Analysts' Recommendations Have Investment Value?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 137-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Loughran, Tim & Ritter, Jay R. & Rydqvist, Kristian, 1994. "Initial public offerings: International insights," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 2(2-3), pages 165-199, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Biais, Bruno & Faugeron-Crouzet, Anne Marie, 2002. "IPO Auctions: English, Dutch, ... French, and Internet," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 9-36, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Sherman, Ann E, 2000. "IPOs and Long-Term Relationships: An Advantage of Book Building," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(3), pages 697-714.
  17. Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, 2004. "Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 33(3), Fall.
  18. Benveniste, Lawrence M. & Spindt, Paul A., 1989. "How investment bankers determine the offer price and allocation of new issues," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 343-361. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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