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Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover

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  • Parrino, Robert
  • Sias, Richard W.
  • Starks, Laura T.
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBX-47F1278-2/2/a84886f307f3601cb2b79423475bbefb
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

    Volume (Year): 68 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 1 (April)
    Pages: 3-46

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:68:y:2003:i:1:p:3-46

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Wahal, Sunil, 1996. "Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(01), pages 1-23, March.
    2. Franklin Allen & Antonio Bernardo & Ivo Welch, 1998. "A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm92, Yale School of Management.
    3. Byrd, John W. & Hickman, Kent A., 1992. "Do outside directors monitor managers? *1: Evidence from tender offer bids," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 195-221, October.
    4. Steven Huddart, 1993. "The Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(11), pages 1407-1421, November.
    5. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1996. "Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 365-395, November.
    6. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June.
    7. Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, 2001. "Institutional Investors And Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 229-259, February.
    8. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1989. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 842-52, September.
    9. John R. Nofsinger & Richard W. Sias, 1999. "Herding and Feedback Trading by Institutional and Individual Investors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 2263-2295, December.
    10. Borokhovich, Kenneth A. & Parrino, Robert & Trapani, Teresa, 1996. "Outside Directors and CEO Selection," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(03), pages 337-355, September.
    11. Lakonishok, Josef, et al, 1991. "Window Dressing by Pension Fund Managers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 227-31, May.
    12. Guercio, Diane Del & Hawkins, Jennifer, 1999. "The motivation and impact of pension fund activism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 293-340, June.
    13. Russ Wermers, 1999. "Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 581-622, 04.
    14. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    15. Brickley, James A. & Lease, Ronald C. & Smith, Clifford Jr., 1988. "Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 267-291, January.
    16. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    17. Falkenstein, Eric G, 1996. " Preferences for Stock Characteristics as Revealed by Mutual Fund Portfolio Holdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 111-35, March.
    18. Willard T. Carleton & James M. Nelson & Michael S. Weisbach, 1998. "The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1335-1362, 08.
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    Cited by:
    1. Bessler, Wolfgang & Blake, David & Lückoff, Peter & Tonks, Ian, 2010. "Why does mutual fund performance not persist? The impact and interaction of fund flows and manager changes," MPRA Paper 34185, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Hadem, Michael, 2010. "Bedingungen und Konsequenzen des Wechsels von Finanzvorständen - Eine Analyse in großen börsennotierten Unternehmen," EconStor Theses, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, number 43681.
    3. Pierre Chaigneau, 2010. "The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation," FMG Discussion Papers dp660, Financial Markets Group.
    4. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 1207, CIRPEE.
    5. Klaus Schaeck & Martin Cihak & Andrea Maechler & Stephanie Stolz, 2011. "Who Disciplines Bank Managers?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 197-243.
    6. Lily Qiu, 2004. "Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2497, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jun 2006.
    7. Alex Edmans & Vivian W. Fang & Emanuel Zur, 2013. "The Effect of Liquidity on Governance," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(6), pages 1443-1482.
    8. Carine Girard, 2004. "L’incidence de l’activisme actionnarial sur les mécanismes de gouvernance:le cas français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 7(3), pages 91-116, September.
    9. Ljungqvist, Alexander & Marston, Felicia & Starks, Laura T. & Wei, Kelsey D. & Yan, Hong, 2007. "Conflicts of interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 420-456, August.
    10. Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, 2009. "The "Wall Street Walk" and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(7), pages 2445-2485, July.
    11. Yener Altunbaş & Alper Kara & Adrian van Rixtel, 2007. "Corporate governance and corporate ownership: The investment behaviour of Japanese institutional investors," Banco de Espa�a Occasional Papers 0703, Banco de Espa�a.
    12. Stephen G. Dimmock & William C. Gerken & Zoran Ivković & Scott J. Weisbenner, 2014. "Capital Gains Lock-In and Governance Choices," NBER Working Papers 20176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Tao Chen, 2009. "Informational Efficiency: Which Institutions Matter?," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 141-168, June.
    14. Lili Qiu, 2004. "Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity," Working Papers 2004-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    15. Cziraki, P. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2009. "Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective," Discussion Paper 2009-019, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.

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