The Use of an Agent in a Signalling Model
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 60 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Caillaud, Bernard & Hermalin, Benjamin, 1991. "The Use of an Agent in a Signaling Model," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt5481b61w, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Bernard Caillaud and Benjamin Hermalin., 1991. "The Use of an Agent in a Signalling Model," Economics Working Papers 91-183, University of California at Berkeley.
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- Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Katz, Michael, 2007.
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- Neelam Jain & Thomas D. Jeitschko & Leonard J. Mirman, 2003. "Entry Deterrence under Agency Constraints," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 2(3), pages 179-195, December.
- Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Maderner, Nina, 1998. "Are Two a Good Representative for Many?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 90-104, November.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0613, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
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