Entry Deterrence under Agency Constraints
AbstractWe study models of signaling and entry deterrence when the incumbent firm is subject to agency restraints and the principal does not have the relevant information to signal to the potential entrant. The informational implications of the dynamic agency relationship are fully identified. A characterization of optimal contracts is given for both the case of deterministic markets as well as stochastic markets. Moreover, the differences between whether incentive contracts are observable or hidden are presented. We find that one would expect that the study of agency and entry is relevant in many markets, as agency makes entry more lucrative and principals may have reasons to invite entry to alleviate agency costs. We also propose empirically testable hypotheses that are based on the insights of this paper. This study suggests that entry deterrence is more likely to occur in less volatile markets. Also, entry deterrence is found to be more effective when incentives can credibly be made public.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.
Volume (Year): 2 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
entry deterrence; agency; financial intermediation; licensing; divisionalization;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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