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Make or brake — Rich states in voluntary federal emission pricing

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  • Roolfs, Christina
  • Gaitan, Beatriz
  • Edenhofer, Ottmar

Abstract

Voluntary participation can improve multilateral environmental governance. We model voluntary participation of states in unanimously approved federal environmental policy. A Pareto-improving federal emission price coexists with state-level emission pricing. Federal revenues are distributed equally per capita (egalitarian), in proportion to states' historical emission levels (sovereignty), or states’ actual payments (juste retour). We find that the existence of Pareto-improving uniform federal prices depends on wealth differences, transfer rules, and on whether or not states anticipate transfers. Sovereignty transfers work in all cases. Differences in wealth can undermine egalitarian transfers. Juste retour transfers render federal policy ineffective if states anticipate them. The richest state prefers the lowest Pareto-optimal federal price (“minimum price”) as it becomes the largest net-donor. Adding different population sizes, the richest and largest (smallest) state prefers the minimum price with sovereignty and juste retour transfers (egalitarian transfers). Therefore, rich states brake and simultaneously make possible passing unanimous federal policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Roolfs, Christina & Gaitan, Beatriz & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2021. "Make or brake — Rich states in voluntary federal emission pricing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:109:y:2021:i:c:s0095069621000462
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102463
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    2. Meya, Jasper N. & Neetzow, Paul, 2021. "Renewable energy policies in federal government systems," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    3. Ernst, Anne & Hinterlang, Natascha & Mahle, Alexander & Stähler, Nikolai, 2022. "Carbon pricing, border adjustment and climate clubs: An assessment with EMuSe," Discussion Papers 25/2022, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    4. Siying Yang & Hua Bai & An Li, 2023. "A futile help: do vertical transfer payments promote haze control?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 56(5), pages 3411-3436, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental regulation; Fiscal federalism; Pollution taxes; Transfer design; Voluntary participation; Pareto-improvements; Minimum price;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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