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Tax Interactions with Asymmetric Information and Nonlinear Instruments

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  • Florence TOUYA

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Tax Interactions with Asymmetric Information and Nonlinear Instruments

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Paper provided by CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour in its series Working Papers with number 9.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Date of revision: Nov 2009
Handle: RePEc:tac:wpaper:9

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  1. Brulhart, Marius & Jametti, Mario, 2006. "Vertical versus horizontal tax externalities: An empirical test," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2027-2062, November.
  2. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2009. "Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common-agency games," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 78-102.
  3. Linda Andersson & Thomas Aronsson & Magnus Wikstr–m, 2004. "Testing for Vertical Fiscal Externalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 243-263, 05.
  4. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-72, September.
  5. Olsen, Trond E. & Osmundsen, Petter, 2001. "Strategic tax competition; implications of national ownership," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 253-277, August.
  6. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," CESifo Working Paper Series 581, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. David E. Wildasin, 2005. "Fiscal Competition," Working Papers, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations 2005-05, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
  8. Léonard,Daniel & Long,Ngo van, 1992. "Optimal Control Theory and Static Optimization in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521337465.
  9. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Vigneault, Marianne, 1998. "The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 453-478, June.
  10. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2003. "Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 177-199, 04.
  11. Martimort, David, 1992. "Multi-Principaux avec Anti-Sélection," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 14, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  12. Esteller-More, Alex & Sole-Olle, Albert, 2001. "Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: evidence from the US," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 247-272, April.
  13. Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
  14. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  15. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1996. "Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-155, May.
  16. Timothy J. Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, 1999. "Vertical Externalities in Tax Setting: Evidence from Gasoline and Cigarettes," NBER Working Papers 6517, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 2000. "Tax structure in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 493-506, March.
  18. Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June.
  19. Laurent Flochel & Thierry Madies, 2002. "Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping Revenue Maximizing Governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 121-141, March.
  20. Rizzo, Leonzio, 2005. "Interaction between Vertical and Horizontal tax Competition: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 5334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Masayoshi Hayashi & Robin Boadway, 2001. "An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business income taxes in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(2), pages 481-503, May.
  22. Craig Brett & Joris Pinkse, 2000. "The determinants of municipal tax rates in British Columbia," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(3), pages 695-714, August.
  23. Johnson, William R, 1988. "Income Redistribution in a Federal System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 570-73, June.
  24. Dahlby, Bev & Wilson, Leonard S., 2003. "Vertical fiscal externalities in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 917-930, May.
  25. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March.
  26. Giacomo Calzolari, 2004. "Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 257-282, 02.
  27. Keen, Michael J. & Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2004. "Tax competition in federations and the welfare consequences of decentralization," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 397-407, November.
  28. repec:fth:louvco:9803 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Olsen, Trond & Osmundsen, Petter, 2009. "Multinationals, tax competition, and outside options," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2009/28, University of Stavanger.
  30. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 1999. "Tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies: evidence from OECD countries with implications for the European Union," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 99-39, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  31. Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996. "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  32. Turnbull, Geoffrey K & Djoundourian, Salpie S, 1993. " Overlapping Jurisdictions: Substitutes or Complements?," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 231-45, March.
  33. Charles B. Wagoner, 1995. "Local Fiscal Competition: an Intraregional Perspective," Public Finance Review, , , vol. 23(1), pages 95-114, January.
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