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Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner's dilemma game

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  • Grimm, Veronika
  • Mengel, Friederike

Abstract

Abstract We experimentally investigate the effect of endogenous matching within a segmented population on peoples' willingness to cooperate as well as their attitudes towards cooperative norms. In the experiment participants can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them a (local) punishment institution fosters cooperation. The degree of population viscosity (i.e. the extent to which matching is biased towards within-group interactions) is varied across treatments. We find that both, the share of participants that choose into the group with the punishment institution and the share of participants that cooperate, increase monotonically with the degree of population viscosity. Furthermore - with higher population viscosity - significantly more subjects claim to support a punishment institution in a post-experimental questionnaire.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 78 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 333-348

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:78:y:2011:i:3:p:333-348

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

Related research

Keywords: Experiments Cooperation Punishment institutions Evolution Population viscosity;

References

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  16. Bohnet, Iris & Kübler, Dorothea, 2000. "Compensating the cooperators: Is sorting in the prisoner's dilemma possible?," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,2, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  17. Steffen Huck & Gabriele K. Lünser & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2007. "Consumer Networks and Firm Reputation: A First Experimental Investigation," Discussion Papers 07-28, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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  20. Giorgio Coricelli & Dietmar Fehr & Gerlinde Fellner, 2003. "Partner selection in public goods experiments," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
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