Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Transactions that did not happen and their influence on prices

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kirman, Alan
  • Schulz, Rainer
  • Hardle, Wolfgang
  • Werwatz, Axel

Abstract

This paper studies data from the wholesale fruit and vegetables market in Marseille. We have details of counteroffers to the prices that were proposed by the seller even when no transaction took place. With a simple heoretical model we analyse the evolution of prices during the day and in particular the relation between the final price struck and the proposals of the two parties. Periods with no buyer refusals, of offers or bargaining with no transaction will lead to a revision of the sellerÕs first price. More importantly the sharing of the surplus moves in the buyerÕs favour during the day. These presumptions are then shown to be confirmed by our data set.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F-4F6SSJX-1/2/d5211c225a68ffa2805519ef90f35099
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 56 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 567-591

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:56:y:2005:i:4:p:567-591

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Gerard Weisbuch & Alan Kirman & Dorothea Herreiner, 1995. "Market Organization," Working Papers 95-11-102, Santa Fe Institute.
  2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  3. Gastwirth, Joseph L, 1976. "On Probabilistic Models of Consumer Search for Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(1), pages 38-50, February.
  4. Hardle, Wolfgang & Kirman, Alan, 1995. "Nonclassical demand : A model-free examination of price-quantity relations in the Marseille fish market," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 227-257, May.
  5. McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
  6. Pezanis-Christou, P., 1996. "Sequential Auctions with Supply Uncertainty," Papers 96/15, New South Wales - School of Economics.
  7. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
  8. Michael Rothschild, 1974. "Searching for the Lowest Price When the Distribution of Prices Is Unknown: A Summary," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 3, number 1, pages 293-294 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
  10. Rothschild, Michael, 1974. "Searching for the Lowest Price When the Distribution of Prices Is Unknown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 689-711, July/Aug..
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Juliette Rouchier, 2013. "The Interest of Having Loyal Buyers in a Perishable Market," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 41(2), pages 151-170, February.
  2. Sonia Moulet & Juliette Rouchier, 2009. "The influence of seller learning and time constraints on sequential bargaining in an artificial perishable goods market," Working Papers halshs-00353505, HAL.
  3. Joshua Sherman & Avi Weiss, 2012. "Price Response, Asymmetric Information, and Competition," Working Papers 2012-13, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University.
  4. Giulioni, Gianfranco & Bucciarelli, Edgardo, 2011. "Agents’ ability to manage information in centralized markets: Comparing two wholesale fish markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 34-49.
  5. Franck Galtier & François Bousquet & Martine Antona & Pierre Bommel, 2012. "Markets as communication systems," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 161-201, January.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:56:y:2005:i:4:p:567-591. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.