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Resource rivalry and endogenous lobby

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  • Wang, Jue-Shyan
  • Koo, Hui-wen
  • Chen, Tain-Jy
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VF1-4FVJC07-1/2/3c991853fbf48ec5398f00b7bc9eb767
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Japan and the World Economy.

    Volume (Year): 18 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 488-511

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:japwor:v:18:y:2006:i:4:p:488-511

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505557

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    References

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    1. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    2. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    3. Olarreaga, M, 1996. "Foreign-Owned Captial and Endogenous Tariffs," Research Papers by the Department of Economics, University of Geneva 96.17, Département des Sciences Économiques, Université de Genève.
    4. Cadot, Olivier & de Melo, Jaime & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 1997. "Lobbying and the Structure of Protection," CEPR Discussion Papers 1574, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Baldwin, Robert E, 1989. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 119-35, Fall.
    6. Bhagwati, Jagdish N., 1980. "Lobbying and welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 355-363, December.
    7. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
    8. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August.
    9. Elhanan Helpman, 1995. "Politics and Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 5309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
    11. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
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