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Special Interest Politics and Trade Policy – An Empirical Challenge

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Author Info
Belfrage, Carl-Johan () (Department of Economics, Lund University)

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Abstract

The model of protectionist support for individual industries as an endogenous outcome of special interest politics pioneered by Grossman and Helpman (1994) is generalized and then empirically examined using data for a number of OECD countries and regions. Cross-sectional regressions are performed on the full sample,as well as on individual countries. The model generally holds up quite well to this empirical challenge. The estimates indicate that equilibrium ratios of special interest to general interest marginal utilities (with respect to protection levels) vary positively with protection levels as the theory has led us to expect. Terms of trade concerns seem important to the larger countries in our sample as implied by the present generalization of the GH model (as well as by the optimum tariff literature), but the influence of downstream interests does not come across in the estimates. The results seem robust also to inclusion of variables reflecting exogenous political concerns (indicated as relevant in other studies), although those bring a substantial addition to predictive power which strengthens the impression that (what is endogenously derived in) the GH model only captures a limited share of the considerations underlying trade policy decisions.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2005:31.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 03 Jun 2004
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Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2005_031

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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
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Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/
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Related research
Keywords: Trade policy Lobbying Special interest groups

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Marvel, Howard P & Ray, Edward J, 1983. "The Kennedy Round: Evidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 190-97, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Godek, Paul E, 1986. "The Politically Optimal Tariff: Levels of Trade Restrictions across Developed Countries," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(4), pages 587-93, October.
  5. Ray, Edward John, 1981. "The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(1), pages 105-21, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jong-Wha Lee & Phillip Swagel, 1994. "Trade barriers and trade flows across countries and industries," International Finance Discussion Papers 476, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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  9. Cadot, O & de Mela, J & Olarreaga, M, 1996. "Lobbying and the Structure of Protection," University of Geneva Economics Working Papers 96.14, University of Geneva, Department of Political Economy.
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  10. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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