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  • De Geest, Gerrit
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    Abstract

    Eric Posner (2003) has argued that (contract) law and economics has failed to produce clear policy recommendations because its theoretical results are usually inconclusive and empirical data on the parameters are usually unavailable. Legislators and courts, however, cannot wait to make decisions until scholarship is conclusive; hence the question arises which policy conclusions are the ‘least irrational’ under those circumstances.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 35 (2013)
    Issue (Month): C ()
    Pages: 42-57

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:35:y:2013:i:c:p:42-57

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle

    Related research

    Keywords: Indeterminacy; Contract remedies; Specific performance; Expectation measure; Tinbergen;

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    References

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    1. Hughes Hallett, Andrew J, 1989. "Econometrics and the Theory of Economic Policy: The Tinbergen-Theil Contributions 40 Years On," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 189-214, January.
    2. Gerrit De Geest, 2010. "Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 365-384.
    3. Steven Shavell, 1980. "Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 466-490, Autumn.
    4. Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908, October.
    5. Aghion, Philippe & Hermalin, Benjamin, 1990. "Why Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt4j76f10g, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    6. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, 2005. "The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 207-237, 01.
    7. Friedman, David D, 1989. "An Economic Analysis of Alternative Damage Rules for Breach of Contract," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages 281-310, October.
    8. Aghion, P. & Hermalin, B., 1990. "Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency," DELTA Working Papers 90-14, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    9. Sykes, Alan O, 1990. "The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best World," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 43-94, January.
    10. Craswell, Richard, 1989. "Performance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 365-401, June.
    11. Gerrit De Geest, 2012. "Who Should Be Immune from Tort Liability?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 291 - 319.
    12. Adler, Barry E., 1999. "The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics qt3wh5v8j9, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    13. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, 1991. "Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley V. Baxendale," NBER Working Papers 3696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1995. "Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 189-208, January.
    15. Trimarchi, Pietro, 2003. "Transfers, uncertainty and the cost of disruption," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 49-62, March.
    16. White, Michelle J, 1988. "Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 353-76, June.
    17. Shavell, Steven, 1984. "The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 99(1), pages 121-48, February.
    18. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 667-81, June.
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