Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Inflation targeting rules and welfare in an asymmetric currency area

Contents:

Author Info

  • Lombardo, Giovanni

Abstract

This paper studies the effect on monetary policy of a non-homogeneous degree of competition across the (two) members of a monetary union. In particular, we assess the welfare loss brought about by the use of a simple interest rate rule that does not take into account such structural differences. Our results show that, ceteris paribus, the welfare-maximizing central bank should react more aggressively to the inflation pressure generated by the more competitive economy. We extend the results of Benigno (2003) in two ways. First, we show that, if the degree of competition differs across countries, the optimal rule could involve a larger weight on the more "flexible" country. Second, we allow for a non-unitelastic demand for import. We show that this can alter Benigno's results even under asymmetric degree of competition. Our study suggests that the size of the welfare losses due to the neglect of these asymmetries crucially depends on their actual combination. Furthermore, we show that if information on the true extent of the asymmetries is incomplete, the symmetric rule could outperform the optimal rule. --

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V6D-4HNS6PJ-1/2/01544c105a4e3f906d763f89247bfa68
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 68 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 424-442

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:68:y:2006:i:2:p:424-442

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1998. "Monetary policy rules in practice Some international evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 1033-1067, June.
  2. Pierpaolo Benigno & Michael Woodford, 2004. "Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A Linear-Quadratic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, Volume 18, pages 271-364 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2003. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under Imperfect Competition," NBER Working Papers 10149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Miles S. Kimball, 1996. "The Quantitative Analytics of the Basic Neomonetarist Model," NBER Working Papers 5046, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, January.
  6. Aubhik Khan & Robert G. King & Alexander L. Wolman, 2003. "Optimal Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 825-860, October.
  7. Alan Sutherland, 2002. "International monetary policy coordination and financial market integration," International Finance Discussion Papers 751, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  8. Soderlind, Paul, 1999. "Solution and estimation of RE macromodels with optimal policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 813-823, April.
  9. Mark Bils & Peter J. Klenow, 2002. "Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky Prices," NBER Working Papers 9069, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule," NBER Working Papers 6790, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler & J. David Lopez-Salido, 2001. "European Inflation Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 8218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Lombardo, Giovanni, 2002. "Price rigidity, the mark-up and the dynamics of the current account," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2002,14, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  13. Richard Clarida & Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 1997. "Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory," Economics Working Papers 350, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 1999.
  14. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Pesenti, Paolo, 2002. "International Dimensions of Optimal Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. & Jensen, Henrik, 2005. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 320-352, December.
  16. Julio J. Rotemberg & Michael Woodford, 1998. "Interest-Rate Rules in an Estimated Sticky Price Model," NBER Working Papers 6618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Kim, Jinill & Kim, Sunghyun Henry, 2003. "Spurious welfare reversals in international business cycle models," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 471-500, August.
  18. Peter N. Ireland, 2004. "Technology Shocks in the New Keynesian Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(4), pages 923-936, November.
  19. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2001. "Stabilization policy and the costs of dollarization," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 482-517.
  20. Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff., 1995. "Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C95-048, University of California at Berkeley.
  21. Robert King & Alexander L. Wolman, 1999. "What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky?," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 349-404 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Elizabeth Powers & Nicholas Powers, 2001. "The Size and Frequency of Price Changes: Evidence from Grocery Stores," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 397-416, June.
  23. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2002. "Closing Small Open Economy Models," NBER Working Papers 9270, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Neiss, Katharine S, 1999. "Discretionary Inflation in a General Equilibrium Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 357-74, August.
  25. Lars E.O. Svensson & Michael Woodford, 2000. "Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy," NBER Working Papers 7953, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Michael B. Devereux & Charles Engel, 2003. "Monetary Policy in the Open Economy Revisited: Price Setting and Exchange-Rate Flexibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 765-783.
  27. Benigno, Pierpaolo, 2001. "Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Area," CEPR Discussion Papers 2755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  28. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  29. Lombardo, Giovanni & Sutherland, Alan, 2007. "Computing second-order-accurate solutions for rational expectation models using linear solution methods," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 515-530, February.
  30. Carlton, Dennis W, 1986. "The Rigidity of Prices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 637-58, September.
  31. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
  32. Groth, Charlotta & Johansson, Åsa, 2002. "Bargaining Structure and Nominal Wage Flexibility," Seminar Papers 709, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  33. Lombardo, Giovanni, 2002. "Imperfect Competition, Monetary Policy and Welfare in a Currency Area," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2002,21, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  34. Paolo Angelini & Paolo Del Giovane & Stefano Siviero & Daniele Terlizzese, 2002. "Monetary Policy Rules for the Euro Area: What Role for National Information?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 457, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Arghyrou, Michael G & Gadea, Maria Dolores, 2008. "The single monetary policy and domestic macro-fundamentals: Evidence from Spain," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2008/23, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  2. Agénor, Pierre-Richard & Aizenman, Joshua, 2011. "Capital market imperfections and the theory of optimum currency areas," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(8), pages 1659-1675.
  3. Andrzej Torój, 2010. "Rationality of expectations: another OCA criterion? A DSGE analysis," Working Papers 8, Ministry of Finance in Poland.
  4. Paolo Angelini & Paolo Del Giovane & Stefano Siviero & Daniele Terlizzese, 2008. "Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: What Role for Regional Information?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(3), pages 1-28, September.
  5. Jochen Michaelis, 2012. "Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Union: The Role of the Cost Channel," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201203, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  6. Petrella, Ivan & Santoro, Emiliano, 2010. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Durable Consumption Goods and Factor Demand Linkages," MPRA Paper 21321, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Stéphane Auray & Aurélien Eyquem, 2012. "Welfare Reversal in Monetary Union," Working Papers 2012-33, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  8. Andrzej Toroj, 2011. "Competitiveness channel in Poland and Slovakia: a pre-EMU DSGE analysis," National Bank of Poland Working Papers 86, National Bank of Poland, Economic Institute.
  9. Sophocles N. Brissimis & Ifigeneia Skotida, 2007. "Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area in the Presence of Heterogeneity," Working Papers 62, Bank of Greece.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:68:y:2006:i:2:p:424-442. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.