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The remuneration of independent directors in the UK and Italy: An empirical analysis based on agency theory

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  • Mallin, Chris
  • Melis, Andrea
  • Gaia, Silvia

Abstract

This study investigates independent non-executive directors’ remuneration from an agency theory perspective, taking into account both optimal contracting and managerial power perspectives. Using a sample of 1733 independent non-executive directors’ year observations in Italian and UK non-financial firms listed in the period 2007–2009, we find that in both countries independent non-executive directors’ remuneration is mainly based on the observable effort they exert and their responsibilities. Our findings also show that independent non-executive directors who do not fulfil formal independence criteria, as stated in the respective national corporate governance codes, seem to be paid more than those who do fulfil such criteria, particularly in the UK.

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  • Mallin, Chris & Melis, Andrea & Gaia, Silvia, 2015. "The remuneration of independent directors in the UK and Italy: An empirical analysis based on agency theory," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 175-186.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iburev:v:24:y:2015:i:2:p:175-186
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ibusrev.2014.07.006
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