IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v93y2015icp117-127.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Legislative bargaining with teams

Author

Listed:
  • Bradfield, Anthony J.
  • Kagel, John H.

Abstract

We study legislative bargaining with two person teams versus individuals. Teams come closer to the predictions of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, passing minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) more often and having significantly more proposer power. The increase in proposer power results from increased numbers of MWCs, along with increased proposer power within an MWC. We investigate the driving forces behind teams coming closer to the theoretical predictions. The results favor their greater insightfulness as opposed to being more aggressive or more selfish.

Suggested Citation

  • Bradfield, Anthony J. & Kagel, John H., 2015. "Legislative bargaining with teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 117-127.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:93:y:2015:i:c:p:117-127
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982561500113X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Davis, James H., 1992. "Some compelling intuitions about group consensus decisions, theoretical and empirical research, and interpersonal aggregation phenomena: Selected examples 1950-1990," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 3-38, June.
    2. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    3. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2018. "Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 101-112.
    4. Andrzej Baranski & John H. Kagel, 2015. "Communication in legislative bargaining," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 59-71, July.
    5. Tamar Kugler & Edgar E. Kausel & Martin G. Kocher, 2012. "Are Groups more Rational than Individuals? A Review of Interactive Decision Making in Groups," CESifo Working Paper Series 3701, CESifo.
    6. John H. Kagel & Peter McGee, 2016. "Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 253-276, May.
    7. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    8. Irving Lorge & Herbert Solomon, 1955. "Two models of group behavior in the solution of eureka-type problems," Psychometrika, Springer;The Psychometric Society, vol. 20(2), pages 139-148, June.
    9. Gary Bornstein & Ilan Yaniv, 1998. "Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 101-108, June.
    10. Agranov, Marina & Tergiman, Chloe, 2014. "Communication in multilateral bargaining," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 75-85.
    11. M. Casari & J. Zhang & C. Jackson, 2011. "When Do Groups Perform Better than Individuals? A Company Takeover Experiment," Working Papers wp763, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    12. John Kagel & Katherine Wolfe, 2001. "Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(3), pages 203-219, December.
    13. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990. "The Role of Risk Preferences in Bargaining When Acceptance of a Proposal Requires Less than Unanimous Approval," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 135-154, June.
    14. Frechette, Guillaume & Kagel, John H. & Morelli, Massimo, 2005. "Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1497-1517, August.
    15. Gary Charness & Matthias Sutter, 2012. "Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 157-176, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Miller, Luis & Montero, Maria & Vanberg, Christoph, 2018. "Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 60-92.
    2. repec:nad:wpaper:20220080 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2018. "Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 101-112.
    4. Austin Murphy, 2020. "An Analysis of the Use of Money to Divert the Exercise of Government Power for the Wealthiest," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 1, pages 50-78, March.
    5. Andrzej Baranski, 2019. "Endogenous claims and collective production: an experimental study on the timing of profit-sharing negotiations and production," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(4), pages 857-884, December.
    6. Andrzej Baranski & Rebecca Morton, 2022. "The determinants of multilateral bargaining: a comprehensive analysis of Baron and Ferejohn majoritarian bargaining experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(4), pages 1079-1108, September.
    7. Hakan Genc & Serkan Kucuksenel, 2019. "Bargaining in legislatures over private and public goods with endogenous recognition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 351-373, December.
    8. Andrzej Baranski & D.J. da Cunha Batista Geraldes & Ada Kovaliukaite & James Tremewan, 2021. "Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining," Working Papers 2102, Utrecht School of Economics.
    9. Berry, Kevin & Delmond, Anthony R. & Morin Chassé, Rémi & Strandholm, John C. & Shogren, Jason F., 2022. "A bargaining experiment under weak property rights, with implications for indigenous title claims," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    10. Timothy Flannery & Siyu Wang, 2023. "Is the “smoke‐filled room” necessary? An experimental study of the effect of communication networks on collusion," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(4), pages 1056-1077, April.
    11. Cox, Caleb A. & Stoddard, Brock, 2018. "Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 31-43.
    12. Raja Rajendra Timilsina & Yoshinori Nakagawa & Yoshio Komijo & Koji Kotani & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2021. "Imaginary future generations: A deliberative approach for intergenerational sustainability dilemma," Working Papers SDES-2021-12, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Nov 2021.
    13. Andrzej Baranski & Caleb A. Cox, 2023. "Communication in multilateral bargaining with joint production," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(1), pages 55-77, March.
    14. Timilsina, Raja R & Kotani, Koji & Nakagawa, Yoshinori & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2021. "Concerns for future generations in societies: A deliberative analysis of the intergenerational sustainability dilemma," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    15. Kim, Duk Gyoo, 2023. "“One Bite at the apple”: Legislative bargaining without replacement," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    16. Christiansen, Nels, 2015. "Greasing the wheels: Pork and public goods contributions in a legislative bargaining experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 64-79.
    17. Baranski, Andrzej & Haas, Nicholas, 2023. "The timing of communication and retaliation in bargaining: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cox, Caleb A. & Stoddard, Brock, 2018. "Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 31-43.
    2. Schwaninger, Manuel, 2022. "Sharing with the powerless third: Other-regarding preferences in dynamic bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 341-355.
    3. Gary Charness & David J. Cooper & Zachary Grossman, 2020. "Silence is golden: team problem solving and communication costs," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(3), pages 668-693, September.
    4. Faralla, Valeria & Borà, Guido & Innocenti, Alessandro & Novarese, Marco, 2020. "Promises in group decision making," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 1-11.
    5. Andrzej Baranski & Caleb A. Cox, 2019. "Communication in Multilateral Bargaining with Joint Production," Working Papers 20190032, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Nov 2019.
    6. Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela & Lergetporer, Philipp & Sutter, Matthias, 2021. "Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 131-147.
    7. Auerswald, Heike & Schmidt, Carsten & Thum, Marcel & Torsvik, Gaute, 2018. "Teams in a public goods experiment with punishment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 28-39.
    8. Andrzej Baranski & D.J. da Cunha Batista Geraldes & Ada Kovaliukaite & James Tremewan, 2021. "Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining," Working Papers 2102, Utrecht School of Economics.
    9. Haoran He & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Are teams less inequality averse than individuals?," Post-Print halshs-01077253, HAL.
    10. Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo & Helbach, Christoph, 2014. "Does truth win when teams reason strategically?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 86-89.
    11. He, Haoran & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2017. "Are group members less inequality averse than individual decision makers?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 111-124.
    12. Penczynski, Stefan P., 2016. "Persuasion: An experimental study of team decision making," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 244-261.
    13. Ambrus, Attila & Greiner, Ben & Pathak, Parag A., 2015. "How individual preferences are aggregated in groups: An experimental study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 1-13.
    14. Andrzej Baranski & Rebecca Morton, 2022. "The determinants of multilateral bargaining: a comprehensive analysis of Baron and Ferejohn majoritarian bargaining experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(4), pages 1079-1108, September.
    15. Thum, Marcel & Auerswald, Heike & Schmidt, Carsten & Torsvik, Gaute, 2014. "Teams Contribute More and Punish Less," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100537, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. Haoran He & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Are team members less inequality averse than individual decision makers?," Working Papers halshs-00996545, HAL.
    17. Maaser, Nicola & Paetzel, Fabian & Traub, Stefan, 2019. "Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 433-450.
    18. David J. Cooper & Matthias Sutter, 2011. "Role selection and team performance," Working Papers 2011-14, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    19. Andrzej Baranski & John H. Kagel, 2015. "Communication in legislative bargaining," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 59-71, July.
    20. Christiansen, Nels, 2015. "Greasing the wheels: Pork and public goods contributions in a legislative bargaining experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 64-79.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legislative bargaining; Teams versus individuals; Truth wins;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:93:y:2015:i:c:p:117-127. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.