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Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games

Author

Listed:
  • John H. Kagel
  • Peter McGee

Abstract

In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results from the psychology literature. This quickly gives way to teams cooperating more than individuals. Team dialogues show increased payoffs from cooperation, along with anticipating opponents’ recognition of the same, provides the basis for cooperation, even while fully anticipating defection near the end game. A strong status quo bias in defecting across super-games limits unraveling. Defecting typically occurs one round earlier across super-games, consistent with low marginal, or even negative, benefits of more than one-step-ahead defection. (JEL C72, C73, C90, D12)

Suggested Citation

  • John H. Kagel & Peter McGee, 2016. "Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 253-276, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:8:y:2016:i:2:p:253-76
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140068
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Auerswald, Heike & Schmidt, Carsten & Thum, Marcel & Torsvik, Gaute, 2018. "Teams in a public goods experiment with punishment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 28-39.
    2. Caleb Cox & Matthew Jones & Kevin Pflum & Paul Healy, 2015. "Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 441-484, April.
    3. Cason, Timothy N. & Mui, Vai-Lam, 2019. "Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: A strategy method approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 128-145.
    4. Matthew Embrey & Guillaume R Fréchette & Sevgi Yuksel, 2018. "Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(1), pages 509-551.
    5. David Bruner & Caleb Cox & David M. McEvoy & Brock Stoddard, 2022. "Strategic thinking in contests," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 942-973, June.
    6. Timilsina, Raja R & Kotani, Koji & Nakagawa, Yoshinori & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2021. "Concerns for future generations in societies: A deliberative analysis of the intergenerational sustainability dilemma," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    7. Thum, Marcel & Auerswald, Heike & Schmidt, Carsten & Torsvik, Gaute, 2014. "Teams Contribute More and Punish Less," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100537, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Cox, Caleb A. & Stoddard, Brock, 2018. "Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 31-43.
    9. Bradfield, Anthony J. & Kagel, John H., 2015. "Legislative bargaining with teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 117-127.
    10. Raja Rajendra Timilsina & Koji Kotani & Yoshinori Nakagawa & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2023. "Does Being Intergenerationally Accountable Resolve the Intergenerational Sustainability Dilemma?," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 99(4), pages 644-667.
    11. Philipp Dörrenberg & Christoph Feldhaus, 2022. "How Does Group-Decision Making Affect Subsequent Individual Behavior?," CESifo Working Paper Series 9513, CESifo.
    12. Cason, Timothy N. & Mui, Vai-Lam, 2015. "Individual versus Group Play in the Repeated Coordinated Resistance Game," Journal of Experimental Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 94-106, April.
    13. Somayeh Kokabisaghi & Eric J Pauwels & Andre B Dorsman, 2019. "To snipe or not to snipe, that is the question! Transitions in sniping behaviour among competing algorithmic traders," Papers 1912.04012, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
    14. Kagel, John H., 2018. "Cooperation through communication: Teams and individuals in finitely repeated Prisoners’ dilemma games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 55-64.
    15. Raja Rajendra Timilsina & Yoshinori Nakagawa & Yoshio Komijo & Koji Kotani & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2021. "Imaginary future generations: A deliberative approach for intergenerational sustainability dilemma," Working Papers SDES-2021-12, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Nov 2021.
    16. Stephen Dobson & John Goddard, 2018. "Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner’s Dilemma," Review of Economic Analysis, Digital Initiatives at the University of Waterloo Library, vol. 10(3), pages 285-312, May.
    17. David Gill & Yaroslav Rosokha, 2023. "Beliefs, learning, and personality in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1332, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    18. Miller, Logan & Rholes, Ryan, 2023. "Joint vs. Individual performance in a dynamic choice problem," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 897-934.
    19. Cason, Timothy N. & Lau, Sau-Him Paul & Mui, Vai-Lam, 2019. "Prior interaction, identity, and cooperation in the Inter-group Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 613-629.
    20. Kamei, Kenju & Tabero, Katy, 2021. "The Individual-Team Discontinuity Effect on Institutional Choices: Experimental Evidence in Voluntary Public Goods Provision," MPRA Paper 112106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Lucas C. Coffman & Alexander Gotthard-Real, 2019. "Moral Perceptions of Advised Actions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(8), pages 3904-3927, August.
    22. Yoshitaka Okano, 2017. "Team vs. Individual, Hypothesis Testing vs. Model Selection, and the Minimax Model," Working Papers SDES-2017-18, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2017.
    23. Masaki Aoyagi & Guillaume Frechette & Sevgi Yuksel, 2021. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," ISER Discussion Paper 1119rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised May 2022.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis

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