Chess-like Games Are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps
AbstractWe show that strictly competitive, finite games of perfect information that may end in one of three possible ways can be solved by applying only two rounds of elimination of dominated strategies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 33 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Ewerhart, Christian, 2000. "Chess-like games are dominancesolvable in at most two steps," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 00-24, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
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