IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finana/v84y2022ics1057521922003763.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mandatory disclosure of comment letters and analysts' forecasts

Author

Listed:
  • Hu, Ning
  • Xu, Jiayi
  • Xue, Shuang

Abstract

Comment letters (CLs) have been adopted as the main supervision mechanism for information disclosure by the two main Chinese stock exchanges since 2013. Both CLs and firms' responses have been publicly disclosed since the end of 2014. Using nonfinancial listed firms from 2013 to 2019 as our sample, we investigate the impact of CLs and their mandatory disclosure on analysts' forecast quality. The results show that, in the pre-disclosure period, there is no significant relation between CLs and analysts' forecast quality. However, in the post-disclosure period, CLs are positively (negatively) correlated with analysts' forecast accuracy (optimism). The quality of analysts' forecasts is much higher when CLs contain more questions. In addition, the impact of CLs is larger for samples with a lower percentage of star analysts or samples with higher earnings volatility. CL recipients tend to disclose more information on their internal and external risks, which can offer additional information to analysts.

Suggested Citation

  • Hu, Ning & Xu, Jiayi & Xue, Shuang, 2022. "Mandatory disclosure of comment letters and analysts' forecasts," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:84:y:2022:i:c:s1057521922003763
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2022.102426
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521922003763
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irfa.2022.102426?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Luigi Zingales, 2009. "The Future of Securities Regulation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 391-425, May.
    2. Warren Bailey & Haitao Li & Connie X. Mao & Rui Zhong, 2003. "Regulation Fair Disclosure and Earnings Information: Market, Analyst, and Corporate Responses," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2487-2514, December.
    3. Schick, Allen G. & Gordon, Lawrence A. & Haka, Susan, 1990. "Information overload: A temporal approach," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 199-220.
    4. Cory A. Cassell & Lauren M. Cunningham & Ling Lei Lisic, 2019. "The readability of company responses to SEC comment letters and SEC 10-K filing review outcomes," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 1252-1276, December.
    5. Hans B. Christensen & Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, 2016. "Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Prior Conditions, Implementation, and Enforcement," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(11), pages 2885-2924.
    6. Andrew R. Jackson, 2005. "Trade Generation, Reputation, and Sell‐Side Analysts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 673-717, April.
    7. Clement, Michael B., 1999. "Analyst forecast accuracy: Do ability, resources, and portfolio complexity matter?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 285-303, July.
    8. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-686.
    9. Gintschel, Andreas & Markov, Stanimir, 2004. "The effectiveness of Regulation FD," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 293-314, September.
    10. Joanne Horton & George Serafeim & Ioanna Serafeim, 2013. "Does Mandatory IFRS Adoption Improve the Information Environment?," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(1), pages 388-423, March.
    11. Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik, 2003. "Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 313-351, February.
    12. Rick Johnston & Reining Petacchi, 2017. "Regulatory Oversight of Financial Reporting: Securities and Exchange Commission Comment Letters," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(2), pages 1128-1155, June.
    13. John C. Easterwood & Stacey R. Nutt, 1999. "Inefficiency in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts: Systematic Misreaction or Systematic Optimism?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(5), pages 1777-1797, October.
    14. Francis, J & Soffer, L, 1997. "The relative informativeness of analysts' stock recommendations and earnings forecast revisions," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 193-211.
    15. Miles B. Gietzmann & Helena Isidro, 2013. "Institutional Investors’ Reaction to SEC Concerns about IFRS and US GAAP Reporting," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(7-8), pages 796-841, September.
    16. Lily Fang & Ayako Yasuda, 2014. "Are Stars’ Opinions Worth More? The Relation Between Analyst Reputation and Recommendation Values," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 46(3), pages 235-269, December.
    17. Terence Lim, 2001. "Rationality and Analysts' Forecast Bias," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 369-385, February.
    18. Xu, Nianhang & Chan, Kam C. & Jiang, Xuanyu & Yi, Zhihong, 2013. "Do star analysts know more firm-specific information? Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 89-102.
    19. Givoly, Dan & Lakonishok, Josef, 1979. "The information content of financial analysts' forecasts of earnings: Some evidence on semi-strong inefficiency," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 165-185, December.
    20. Francis, J & Philbrick, D, 1993. "Analysts Decisions As Products Of A Multitask Environment," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 216-230.
    21. Dichev, Ilia D. & Tang, Vicki Wei, 2009. "Earnings volatility and earnings predictability," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1-2), pages 160-181, March.
    22. Miles B. Gietzmann & Angela K. Pettinicchio, 2014. "External Auditor Reassessment of Client Business Risk Following the Issuance of a Comment Letter by the SEC," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 57-85, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Yu & Yang, Lingxuan & Xiong, Lu, 2023. "Performance commitments and the properties of analyst earnings forecasts: Evidence from Chinese reverse merger firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ramnath, Sundaresh & Rock, Steve & Shane, Philip, 2008. "The financial analyst forecasting literature: A taxonomy with suggestions for further research," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 34-75.
    2. Hu, Jun & Long, Wenbin & Luo, Le & Peng, Yuanhuai, 2021. "Share pledging and optimism in analyst earnings forecasts: Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    3. Oya Altınkılıç & Vadim S. Balashov & Robert S. Hansen, 2013. "Are Analysts' Forecasts Informative to the General Public?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(11), pages 2550-2565, November.
    4. Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
    5. Mei-Chen Lin & J. Jimmy Yang, 2023. "Do lottery characteristics matter for analysts’ forecast behavior?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 1057-1091, October.
    6. AltInkIlIç, Oya & Hansen, Robert S., 2009. "On the information role of stock recommendation revisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 17-36, October.
    7. Horton, Joanne & Serafeim, George & Wu, Shan, 2017. "Career concerns of banking analysts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 231-252.
    8. Huang, Lixin & Li, Wei & Wang, Hong & Wu, Liansheng, 2022. "Stock dividend and analyst optimistic bias in earnings forecast," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 643-659.
    9. Régis BRETON & Sébastien GALANTI & Christophe HURLIN & Anne-Gaël VAUBOURG, 2011. "Does the firm-analyst relationship matter in explaining analysts' earnings forecast errors?," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 469, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    10. Lauren Cohen & Andrea Frazzini & Christopher J. Malloy, 2012. "Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of "Independent" Directors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(6), pages 1039-1058, June.
    11. Cowan, Arnold R. & Salotti, Valentina, 2020. "Anti-selective disclosure regulation and analyst forecast accuracy and usefulness," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    12. Mehran, Hamid & Stulz, Rene M., 2007. "The economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 267-296, August.
    13. Xiaomeng Chen & Sue Wright & Hai Wu, 2018. "Exploration intensity, analysts’ private information development and their forecast performance," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(1), pages 77-107, January.
    14. Zhang, Chao & Shrider, David G. & Han, Dun & Wu, Yanran, 2022. "Accurate forecasts attract clients; Biased forecasts keep them happy," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    15. Wu, Yanran & Zhang, Chao, 2022. "Hard to arbitrage, hard for analysts to forecast," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    16. Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Liu, Liuling & Wu, Qiang & Zhao, Yijiang, 2021. "Financial analysts' career concerns and the cost of private debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    17. Dambra, Michael & Field, Laura Casares & Gustafson, Matthew T. & Pisciotta, Kevin, 2018. "The consequences to analyst involvement in the IPO process: Evidence surrounding the JOBS Act," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 302-330.
    18. Xu, Nianhang & Jiang, Xuanyu & Chan, Kam C. & Yi, Zhihong, 2013. "Analyst coverage, optimism, and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 217-239.
    19. Pasaribu, Rowland Bismark Fernando, 2010. "Anomali Overreaction di bursa efek Indonesia: Penelitian Saham LQ-45 [Overreaction Anomaly in Indonesia Stock Exchange: Case Study of LQ-45 Stocks]," MPRA Paper 36998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Bosquet, K. & de Goeij, P. C. & Smedts, K., 2009. "Coexistence and Dynamics of Overconfidence and Strategic Incentives," Discussion Paper 2009-81, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Comment letter; Mandatory disclosure; Analyst forecast quality; Market efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:84:y:2022:i:c:s1057521922003763. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620166 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.