The political economy of long-term care
AbstractWe build a two-dimensional political economy model to explain the provision and financing of long-term care and income redistribution. Voting agents differ in need and income opening up two conflicts: one sets families with disabled parents, who are in favor of a public long-term care program, against the ones without such parents who oppose public financing. The other sets the poor against the rich with the former preferring heavier income taxation than the latter. We show that a structure induced equilibrium always exists and that it is unique if informal care is provided in equilibrium. The equilibrium not only explains the negative association of income inequality and long-term care financing but also allows predictions about how demographic change might impact long-term care arrangements and expenses.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 62 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
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Long-term care; Redistribution; Political economy; Parallel financing of private goods;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
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