Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Private, Social and Self-Insurance for Long-Term Care in the Presence of Family Help - A Political Economy Analysis

Contents:

Author Info

  • Philippe De Donder
  • Pierre Pestieau

Abstract

We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk levels, while private insurance is actuarially fair. The income-to-risk ratio of agents determines whether they prefer social or private insurance. Family support crowds out the demand for both social and, especially, private insurance, as strong prospects of family help drive the demand for private insurance to zero. The availability of private insurance decreases the demand for social insurance but need not decrease its majority chosen level.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2013/wp-cesifo-2013-07/cesifo1_wp4352.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4352.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4352

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Email:
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: long-term care; social insurance; familism; crowding out; weak and strong prospects of family help; voting;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Nuscheler, Robert & Roeder, Kerstin, 2013. "The political economy of long-term care," Munich Reprints in Economics 19324, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  2. CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1999. "The political economy of social security," CORE Discussion Papers 1999055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Mellor, Jennifer M., 2001. "Long-term care and nursing home coverage: are adult children substitutes for insurance policies?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 527-547, July.
  4. Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, 2007. "Why is the market for long-term care insurance so small?," NBER Chapters, in: Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar (TAPES), Public Policy and Retirement, pages 1967-1991 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. De Donder, Philippe & Leroux, Marie-Louise, 2012. "Behavioral Biases and Long Term Care Annuities: A Political Economy Approach," TSE Working Papers 12-352, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Feb 2013.
  6. Finkelstein, Amy N. & Luttmer, Erzo F. P. & Notowidigdo, Matthew J., 2009. "Approaches to Estimating the Health State Dependence of the Utility Function," Working Paper Series rwp09-002, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  7. Meier, Volker, 1996. "Long-Term Care Insurance and Savings," Munich Reprints in Economics 19245, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  8. Christophe Courbage & Peter Zweifel, 2011. "Two-sided intergenerational moral hazard, long-term care insurance, and nursing home use," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 65-80, August.
  9. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
  10. Zweifel, Peter & Struwe, Wolfram, 1996. "Long-Term Care Insurance and Bequests as Instruments for Shaping Intergenerational Relationships," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 65-76, January.
  11. Norton, Edward C, 1995. "Elderly Assets, Medicaid Policy, and Spend-Down in Nursing Homes," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 41(3), pages 309-29, September.
  12. Amy Finkelstein & Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, 2008. "What Good Is Wealth Without Health? The Effect of Health on the Marginal Utility of Consumption," NBER Working Papers 14089, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Pauly, Mark V, 1990. "The Rational Nonpurchase of Long-term-Care Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 153-68, February.
  14. Joan Costa-Font, 2010. "Family ties and the crowding out of long-term care insurance," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(4), pages 691-712, Winter.
  15. Eric Bonsang, 2008. "Does Informal Care from Children to their Elderly Parents Substitute for Formal Care in Europe?," CREPP Working Papers 0801, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
  16. Tsvetanka Karagyozova & Peter Siegelman, 2012. "Can Propitious Selection Stabilize Insurance markets?," Journal of Insurance Issues, Western Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 121-158.
  17. Van Houtven, Courtney Harold & Norton, Edward C., 2008. "Informal care and Medicare expenditures: Testing for heterogeneous treatment effects," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 134-156, January.
  18. Hansen, Lars Peter & Singleton, Kenneth J, 1983. "Stochastic Consumption, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Asset Returns," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 249-65, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4352. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.