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Majority Rule and the Public Provision of a Private Good

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Author Info
 Gouveia, Miguel

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Abstract

This paper extends the literature on the socialization of commodities by developing a model of voting over the public provision of a private good: health care. The private use of health care is modeled as a supplement rather than as an exclusive alternative to public health care. A majority rule equilibrium is shown to exist. The equilibrium characterization is an example of Director's law of income redistribution. A ban on private health care activities is shown to be opposed by a majority of voters. Implications for the size and distribution of private health care expenditures are drawn. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 93 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
Pages: 221-44
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:93:y:1997:i:3-4:p:221-44

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  1. Levaggi, Rosella & Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "The Flypaper Effect: Evidence from the Italian National Health System," P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers 10, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS. [Downloadable!]
  2. Simona GRASSI, 2006. "On the characteristics of a mixed system of provision of a private good. An application to health care," Departemental Working Papers 2006-14, Department of Economics University of Milan Italy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 2004. "Welfare Enhancing Marginal Tax Rates: The Case of Publicly Provided Day Care," Arbetsrapport 2004:6, Institute for Futures Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Philippe, DE DONDER & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2006. "Equilibrium Social Insurance with Policy-Motivated Parties," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006018, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a two-class economy," P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers 12, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS. [Downloadable!]
  6. DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2003. "Policy-Oriented Parties and the Choice between Social and Private Insurance," IDEI Working Papers 226, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Sophia Delipalla & Owen O'Donnell, 1999. "The Political Economy of a Publicly Provided Private Good with Adverse Selection," Studies in Economics 9911, Department of Economics, University of Kent. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jacob, Johanna & Lundin, Douglas, 2001. "A Median Voter Model of Health Insurance with Ex Post Moral Hazard," Working Paper Series 2001:7, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Friedrich Breyer, 2001. "Income Redistribution and the Political Economy of Social Health Insurance : Comparing Germany and Switzerland," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 253, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  10. Pau Olivella & Marcos Vera-Hernandez, 2006. "Testing for adverse selection into private medical insurance," IFS Working Papers W06/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jack, William, 2000. "Health insurance reform in four Latin American countries : theory and practice," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2492, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  12. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2008. "Toward an Efficiency Rationale for the Public Provision of Private Goods," NBER Working Papers 13827, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Rainald Borck, 2005. "Voting, Inequality, and Redistribution," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 503, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  14. John Hall & Ian Preston, 1998. "Public and private choice in UK health insurance," IFS Working Papers W98/19, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  15. Henning Bohn & Charles Stuart, 2003. "Voting and Nonlinear Taxes in a Stylized Representative Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  16. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 1998. "The Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods," Working Paper Series 1998:14, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Leonardo Gasparini & Santiago Pinto, 2005. "Equality of Opportunity and Optimal Cash and In-Kind Policies," Working Papers 0022, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Josse Delfgaauw, 2007. "Dedicated Doctors: Public and Private Provision of Health Care with Altruistic Physicians," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-010/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 17 Sep 2007. [Downloadable!]
  19. Carol Propper, 2001. "Expenditure on healthcare in the UK: a review of the issues," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 22(2), pages 151-183, June. [Downloadable!]
  20. Soeren Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen, 2003. "Is there a Case for Public Provision of Private Goods if Preferences are Heterogeneous? An Example with Day Care," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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