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Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study

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Author Info
Guth, Werner
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
Wolfstetter, Elmar

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Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-4DS6WGB-1/2/6369c69f4507aa3561aa4a3204907b2c
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 49 (2005)
Issue (Month): 7 (October)
Pages: 1891-1913
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:49:y:2005:i:7:p:1891-1913

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  1. Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "An experimental comparison of sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies," Research Memoranda 055, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alexander Elbittar, 2003. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price Auctions: A Laboratory Study," Working Papers 0304, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Oliver Kirchkamp, & Eva Poen, & Philipp Reiß, 2006. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0605, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2003. "Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 578.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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  5. A. Alexander Elbittar, 2005. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price," Microeconomics 0508008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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