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Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case

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Todd R. Kaplan
Shmuel Zamir

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 321307000000000410.

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Date of creation: 22 Sep 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000410

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  1. Lebrun, Bernard, 1998. "Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 97-110, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Plum, M, 1992. "Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 393-418.
  3. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  4. Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-42, February.
  5. Cantillon, Estelle, 2008. "The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1996. " Auctions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(4), pages 367-420, December.
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  7. Jacob Rubinstein & Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Shmuel Zamir, 2001. "First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 461-480. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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