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On the Impact of Low-Balling : Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions

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  • Pezanis-Christou, P

Abstract

The paper reports on a series of experiments in asymmetric First-and Second-Price auctions with private-independent values. The data reveals that although subjects did realize the strategic implications of the asymmetric setting, a significant overbidding pattern was found in First-Price auctions and caused the regjection of the suggested revenue ranking.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by New South Wales - School of Economics in its series Papers with number 97/05.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:nesowa:97/05

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Postal: THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, P.O.B. 1 KENSINGTON, NEW SOUTH WALES 2033 AUSTRALIA.
Phone: (+61)-2-9385-3380
Fax: +61)-2- 9313- 6337
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Web page: http://www.economics.unsw.edu.au/
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Related research

Keywords: AUCTIONS; ECONOMETRICS; DECISION MAKING; INFORMATION;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2003. "Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 578.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Sonsino, Doron, 2004. "Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 561-583, August.
  3. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2005. "Price formation in a sequential selling mechanism," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 92, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  4. Kirill Chernomaz, 2014. "Adaptive learning in an asymmetric auction: genetic algorithm approach," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 27-51, April.
  5. Alexander Elbittar, 2003. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price Auctions: A Laboratory Study," Working Papers 0304, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  6. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2002. "The Amsterdam Auction," Microeconomics 0205002, EconWPA.
  7. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Sonsino, Doron, 2001. "Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,69, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  8. Ronald Harstad, 2000. "Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 261-280, December.
  9. repec:wyi:journl:002123 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Güth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2001. "Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,15, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  11. A. Alexander Elbittar, 2005. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price," Microeconomics 0508008, EconWPA.
  12. Chernomaz, Kirill, 2012. "On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 690-710.

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