On the Impact of Low-Balling : Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions

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On the Impact of Low-Balling : Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions

Author Info

Pezanis-Christou, P

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Paul Pezanis-Christou

Abstract

The paper reports on a series of experiments in asymmetric First-and Second-Price auctions with private-independent values. The data reveals that although subjects did realize the strategic implications of the asymmetric setting, a significant overbidding pattern was found in First-Price auctions and caused the regjection of the suggested revenue ranking.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by New South Wales - School of Economics in its series Papers with number 97/05.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:nesowa:97/05

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Article
- Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2002. "On the impact of low-balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 69-89. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Sadrieh, A. & Pezanis-Christou, P., 2003. "Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions," Discussion Paper 58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Paul Pezanis-Christou & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2003. "Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 578.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
Alexander Elbittar, 2003. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price Auctions: A Laboratory Study," Working Papers 0304, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Elbittar, Alexander, 2009. "Impact of valuation ranking information on bidding in first-price auctions: A laboratory study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 75-85, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
A. Alexander Elbittar, 2005. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price," Microeconomics 0508008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2005. "Price formation in a sequential selling mechanism," Discussion Papers 92, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kroger, 2005. "Price Formation in a Sequential Selling Mechanism," Cahiers de recherche 0530, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2008. "Price formation in a sequential selling mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 832-843, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2002. "The Amsterdam Auction," Microeconomics 0205002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Ronald Harstad, 2000. "Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 261-280, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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