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Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers

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  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques
  • Martimort, David

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 42 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3-5 (May)
Pages: 673-684

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:673-684

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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References

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  1. Martimort, David, 1996. "The multiprincipal nature of government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 673-685, April.
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1994. "Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior," IDEI Working Papers 44, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  3. Martimort, David, 1999. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(4), pages 929-47, October.
  4. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-40, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Bos, Dieter, 2000. "Earmarked taxation: welfare versus political support," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 439-462, March.
  2. David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger & Marco Portmann, 2014. "Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 207-229, June.
  3. Rajabiun, Reza & Middleton, Catherine, 2013. "Regulation, investment and efficiency in the transition to next generation networks: Evidence from the European Union," 24th European Regional ITS Conference, Florence 2013 88536, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
  4. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2010. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1008-1019, December.
  5. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2005. "The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," CEPR Discussion Papers 4992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Dieter Bös, 1999. "Earmarked Taxation: Welfare versus Political Support," CESifo Working Paper Series 207, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Roland Vaubel, 1999. "Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 327-338, November.
  8. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00566863 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, 2002. "Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1448-1471, December.
  10. Frank Bickenbach, 2000. "Regulation of Europe's Network Industries: The Perspective of the New Economic Theory of Federalism," Kiel Working Papers 977, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  11. Billy Jack, 2003. "Comparing the distortionary effects of alternative in-kind intergovernmental transfers," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-17, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  12. Frank Bickenbach & Lars Kumkar & Rüdiger Soltwedel, 1999. "The New Institutional Economics of Antitrust and Regulation," Kiel Working Papers 961, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  13. Sebastiano Bavetta & Fabio Padovano, 2000. "A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 5-25, March.

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