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Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Kocher, Martin G.
Martinsson, Peter
Visser, Martine
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The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor the level of punishment.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters .
Volume (Year): 99 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 508-511
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:508-511Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Simon Gaechter & Benedikt Herrmann, 2006.
"The limits of self-governance in the presence of spite: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia ,"
Discussion Papers
2006-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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Other versions: Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1993.
"Rewards, Experience and Decision Costs in First Price Auctions ,"
Economic Inquiry ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 31(2), pages 237-45, April.
Lisa Cameron, 1995.
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Working Papers
724, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
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Other versions: Anderson, Christopher M. & Putterman, Louis, 2006.
"Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, January.
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Other versions: Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000.
"Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
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Other versions: Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002.
"Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
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Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Mahmud, Minhaj & Martinsson, Peter, 2005.
"Does stake size matter in trust games? ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 365-369, September.
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