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Abstract

The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor the level of punishment.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-4PW5XFY-1/1/da0f556ce17b79b12469c00c1c77c852
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 99 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 508-511

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:508-511

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
   
   • Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
   • Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
2. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
3. Camerer, Colin F & Hogarth, Robin M, 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 7-42, December.
   
   • Camerer, Colin F. & Hogarth, Robin M., 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Working Papers 1059, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
4. Jeffrey Carpenter & Eric Verhoogen & Stephen Burks, 2003. "The Effect of Stakes in Distribution Experiments," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 03-28, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
   
   • Carpenter, Jeffrey & Verhoogen, Eric & Burks, Stephen, 2005. "The effect of stakes in distribution experiments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 393-398, March.
5. Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "The Demand for Punishment," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0243, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
   
   • Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "The demand for punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 522-542, April.
6. Louis Putterman & Christopher M. Anderson, 2003. "Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Working Papers 2003-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
   
   • Anderson, Christopher M. & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, January.
7. Lisa Cameron, 1995. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesia," Working Papers 724, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
   
   • Cameron, Lisa A, 1999. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
8. Clark, Kenneth & Sefton, Martin, 2001. "The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(468), pages 51-68, January.
9. Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Mahmud, Minhaj & Martinsson, Peter, 2005. "Does stake size matter in trust games?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 365-369, September.
   
   • Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Mahmud, Minhaj & Martinsson, Peter, 2004. "Does stake size matter in trust games?," Working Papers in Economics 140, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
10. Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
11. James M. Walker & Matthew A. Halloran, 2004. "Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 235-247, October.

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Cited by:

1. Lefèbvre, Mathieu & Vieider, Ferdinand M. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2009. "Incentive Effects on Risk Attitude in Small Probability Prospects," IZA Discussion Papers 4545, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
   
   • Lefebvre, Mathieu & Vieider, Ferdinand M. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2010. "Incentive effects on risk attitude in small probability prospects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 115-120, November.
   • Mathieu Lefebvre & Ferdinand Vieider & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2010. "Incentive Effects on Risk Attitude in Small Probability Prospects," Post-Print halshs-00550469, HAL.
   • Mathieu Lefebvre & Ferdinand Vieider & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2009. "Incentive Effects on Risk Attitude in Small Probability Prospects," Working Papers 0926, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
   • Mathieu Lefebvre & Ferdinand Vieider & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2009. "Incentive Effects on Risk Attitude in Small Probability Prospects," Post-Print halshs-00435957, HAL.
2. Daniel Arce & Sneha Bakshi & Rachel Croson & Catherine Eckel & Enrique Fatas & Malcolm Kass, 2011. "Counterterrorism strategies in the lab," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 465-478, December.
3. Hasson, Reviva & Löfgren, Åsa & Visser, Martine, 2009. "Climate Change in a Public Goods Game: Investment Decision in Mitigation versus Adaptation," Working Papers in Economics 416, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
   
   • Hasson, Reviva & Löfgren, Åsa & Visser, Martine, 2010. "Climate change in a public goods game: Investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 331-338, December.
   • Hasson, Reviva & Löfgren, Åsa & Visser, Martine, 2009. "Climate Change in a Public Goods Game: Investment Decision in Mitigation versus Adaptation," Discussion Papers dp-09-23-efd, Resources For the Future.
4. Eckel, Catherine & Gintis, Herbert, 2010. "Blaming the messenger: Notes on the current state of experimental economics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 109-119, January.
5. Ralph-C Bayer & Elke Renner & Rupert Sausbruber, 2012. "Confusion and Learning in the Voluntary Contributions Game," Discussion Papers 2012-18, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

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