Sequential parimutuel games
AbstractIn a parimutuel betting system, a successful player's return depends on the number of players who choose the same action. This paper examines a general solution for two-action sequential parimutuel games, and shows how the (unique) equilibrium of such games leads to a simple pattern of behaviour. In particular, we show that there is an advantage to being an early mover, that early players might choose actions with an ex ante low probability of success, and that player action choices can 'flip' with small changes in the parameters of the game.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 72 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
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