Agents with imperfect empathy may survive natural selection
AbstractCultural transmission mechanisms which favor the direct transmission of the parents traits to their children may be adaptative to natural selection when opposed to mechanisms in which the parents choose for the offspring the highest fitness at any time. This is so, in particular, in environments in which the determinants of the reproductive success of a cultural trait are highly variable.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 71 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1999. "Agents with Imperfect Empathy. May Survive Natural Selection," DELTA Working Papers 1999-11, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1999. "Agents with Imperfect Empathy May Survive Natural Selection," Papers 1999-11, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
- Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
- Z00 - Other Special Topics - - General - - - General
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