Mark-up pricing and bilateral monopoly
AbstractIt is an empirically established fact that managers use cost based percentage margins when they price their goods. As a consequence, percentage mark-ups should be determined as equilibrium choices. This paper incorporates this empirical observation into the analysis of competition among bilateral monopolists.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 54 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Andreas IRMEN., 1996. "Mark-Up Pricing and Bilateral Monopoly," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9622, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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