Symbiotic Production and Downstream Market Competition
AbstractIt is well known that the double marginalization problem in the vertical relation can be eliminated by collusion, but it is undesirable because of the monopoly pricing outcome. This study addresses the role of downstream market competition under symbiotic production and demonstrates that incorporating different types of competition in product markets will partially eliminate inefficiency caused by double marginalization. It suggests that introducing callback services or internet telephones creates an environment similar to downward market competition in the output market; hence, it is observed that international tariffs are significantly reduced. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by International Atlantic Economic Society in its journal Atlantic Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 40 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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More information through EDIRC
Symbiotic production; Double marginalization; Downstream market competition; L11; L13; L22;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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