Quality certification standards in competitive markets: When consumers and producers (dis)agree
AbstractA quality certification standard in a competitive setting can improve welfare but may affect consumers and producers differently. In a competitive model with quality preferences of the vertical product differentiation type, we find that producers prefer a higher (lower) quality standard than consumers if individual demand functions are log-convex (log-concave).
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 104 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Comparative statics Log-concavity Minimum quality standards Quality certification Vertical product differentiation;
Other versions of this item:
- Lapan, Harvey E. & Moschini, GianCarlo, 2009. "Quality Certification Standards in Competitive Markets: When Consumers and Producers (Dis)Agree," Staff General Research Papers 13048, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
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